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In Europe’s biggest wave of refugees since World War II, over 1 million 
people fleeing protracted conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan crossed the 
Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats in 2015 in a desperate bid to reach the continent. 
Rather than uniting to deal with the humanitarian situation, the European Union (EU), 
the world’s wealthiest and most integrated bloc, struggled to effectively manage the 
flow of refugees. Amid rising anti-immigration sentiment and nascent 
Euroscepticism, EU governments employed unilateral and security-driven responses 
aimed at limiting the number of refugees that would enter Europe. Europe’s Refugee 
Crisis, as it came to be known, has unsettled the EU like no crisis ever before. This 
thesis demonstrates that populist right wing parties are responsible for the staunch 
anti-immigrant sentiment as well as the increasingly restrictive policies on asylum in 
Europe. By examining France and Germany, the EU’s two founding members, this 
thesis shows that populist right wing parties sowed political discontent by portraying 
migrants as a threat to jobs and to national identity. These messages achieved 
widespread acceptance, even mainstream status, in large part because establishment 
parties validated right wing discourse and demands in a desperate effort to retain their 
appeal to voters. The result was a marked shift to the right on immigration and 
asylum policies. That, in turn, has increased the suffering of thousands of people who 
have sought refuge in Europe. The rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe and 
the consequent resurgence of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment also puts at 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
Against the backdrop of unprecedented numbers of people being displaced by 
conflicts worldwide1, over 1 million asylum seekers and migrants crossed the 
Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats in 2015 in a desperate bid to reach European 
shores.2 That same year, over 3 thousand people died or drowned while making the 
journey. The world witnessed wrenching scenes of hysterical families trying to reach 
Europe and images of drowning children. Despite repeated calls by human rights 
groups, the member states of the European Union (EU) did not open safe and legal 
pathways for refugees to seek asylum.3 This, however, did not deter people, 
predominantly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq from fleeing protracted conflicts and 
persecution in their countries. They kept coming, mostly on flimsy boats or on foot 
through dangerous land routes – often paying smugglers.  
Instead of adopting a unified approach that would have shared the 
responsibility for taking in refugees, European states opted to enforce unilateral 
actions that contrasted with their declared values and with international treaties on 
refugees. 4 States erected fences first with states outside of the EU, but later between 
EU states, including members of Europe’s passport-free area, the Schengen zone. The 
fences, often manned by armed guards, blocked refugees, diverted their passage or 
trapped them to open fields. Macedonia built a fence along its border with Greece, 
blocking a key transit route. Greece built a fence and electronic surveillance system 
                                                 
1 According to UNHCR a record high of 65.3 million people were displaced due to conflict and 
persecution in 2015. Available on http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-
forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html 
2 Find more data http://data.unhcrorg/mediterranean/regional.php 
3 See more info: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/16060-deaths-on-the-
mediterranean-european-states-should-create-legal-safe 
4 Newland et al., 2016 
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along its border with Turkey. Austria erected a barrier along its border with Slovenia 
and capped the numbers of people it would admit, as well as how many it would 
allow to cross into Germany. As tensions rose, on March 18, 2016, the EU heads of 
state reached consensus on a deal that, in effect, outsourced the problem to Turkey. In 
exchange for Turkey’s stemming the flow of refugees to the EU and agreeing to 
provide a haven for those refugees repatriated by European states, the EU promised to 
accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals and pledged more than $6 billion 
towards the assistance of Turkey’s refugee population. The transactional nature of the 
deal which focuses solely on migration management, sparked condemnations from 
rights groups, who also argued that the agreement was in violation of EU law and 
international human rights law.5 The fate of the deal is now uncertain because of 
tensions between the two sides and political instability in Turkey.  
The thousands of refugees who had hoped to reach the United Kingdom 
through the English Channel encountered rejection. Britain built an even higher wall 
topped with razor wire around the undersea tunnel—one that was heavily policed. 
Thousands of people were trapped in the Jungle, as the Calais camp came to be 
called, among them hundreds of unaccompanied minors. The trash-strewn camp, 
which was set up on a former landfill site, also came to symbolize the EU 
governments’ unwillingness to cooperate with one another on their humanitarian 
obligations as well as their lack of empathy for the plight of refugees. After the 
camp’s permanence became a growing source of embarrassment for the French and 
the British governments, the refugees were relocated to multiple other holding 
                                                 
5 Newland, 82 
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facilities around Paris in October 2016, two years after the Jungle was first set up. 
The camp was razed. 
1.1 Argument 
In this thesis, I will argue that the roots of this lack of cooperation lie in 
domestic politics. The prevailing attitude in Europe toward refugees is that they are 
economically driven migrants who are unworthy of asylum in Europe or potential 
terrorists who must be kept out. As I will show, using polls taken over the years and 
direct quotes from political actors, right-wing political leaders have produced and 
shaped this lack of empathy towards refugees. Right-wing populist leaders in the EU 
have politicized the issue of asylum, framing it as a crisis, an existential threat to 
European Christian identity and an economic burden. They have mobilized people 
around the idea that migration poses a security threat and therefore warrants 
containment. They have also monopolized the debate on migration, in large part due 
to their ability to sell their fear-based messages to publics, but also due to the 
mainstream’s unwillingness to directly confront or challenge such messages. This has 
led to the shunning of any discussion on the reasons people seek asylum, on the 
benefits of migration in an aging European workforce, or the assistance of refugees as 
a humanitarian obligation and a public good. Liberal and left wing parties have 
shifted to the right on the refugee issue, so as not to be outflanked by the increasingly 
influential populist anti-immigrant right.  
I point out how right wing populist parties were a fringe movement in Europe 
just twenty years ago; today they have firmly established themselves in the 
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mainstream in over half a dozen countries.6 And where right-wing populists have not 
gained power, they are enjoying unprecedented popularity. These parties, which are 
opposed to the basic cooperative and humanitarian principles of the EU, hamper 
mainstream leaders’ ability to allocate funds towards refugee assistance or to put in 
place even limited resettlement policies. Far right parties do so by challenging ruling 
governments through the spreading of often unsubstantiated messages that exaggerate 
the risks and costs of the assistance of refugees. They instead propose security-
centered solutions as the only viable option, swaying public support in their direction. 
The populist messages, which appeal to nationalism, the collective and the personal 
interests of people, have stoked anxieties by connecting immigration to crime, 
terrorism and a loss of identity. A security response to migration now shapes asylum 
and migration policy across much of Europe.  
1.2 Organization 
This thesis is organized into six parts. The first chapter will define right wing 
populism through a review of the most prominent literature on the topic and provide 
an outline of which parties in Europe can be categorized as populist. I will discuss the 
recent ascent of these parties and address the ways in which a continued rise in their 
popularity could shape the entire political sphere. The rise of anti-immigrant 
populism also has humanitarian consequences: thousands of refugees have to contend 
with a Europe that is increasingly restricting its rules on asylum. I then define the key 
terms refugee, asylum seeker and migrant and introduce my case studies, Germany 
and France. The second chapter provides a brief historical survey of the emergence 
and evolution of the European Union. I mention the 2009 Euro Crisis as a defining 
                                                 
6 Malone, 3 
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moment in the evolution of the European integration project, as it has led to a loss of 
faith in EU institutions. I then provide a concise history of migration to Europe, 
tracing its advent to the labor shortages of the post-war reconstruction period. I 
conclude by demonstrating how populism in Europe emerged in the early 1980s in 
response to increased migration and to populist actors who began to gain ground 
running on anti-immigration platforms. The third chapter outlines European states’ 
response to the refugee flows, even before they were declared to be a crisis and show 
how it largely pandered to the populist agenda of keeping migrants out. I discuss 
European identity, the construction of Muslims as “the other,” as well as some of the 
laws that have been designed to limit the religious and social freedoms of Europe’s 
Muslim citizens. I argue that populist parties are responsible for the widespread 
perception that Muslims do not and cannot belong in Europe, which in turn has 
formed the basis for populism’s opposition to admitting Muslim migrants from Syria 
or Iraq. Finally, I discuss mainstreaming, which is establishment parties’ effort to 
appropriate politically successful populist ideas in an effort to recapture lost votes and 
to undercut the appeal of populism. The fourth and fifth chapters are the case studies 
of Germany and France respectively. I discuss each country’s confrontation with 
populism and the uniqueness of each case. I demonstrate how despite variation in the 
conditions under which populism emerged or is maintained, establishment parties’ 
response to right wing populism has been similar: cooption of ideas that restrict 
migration and an overall shift to the right. The sixth section offers concluding 




1.3 What is right-wing populism?  
Hans-Georg Betz suggests that right-wing populist parties are first and 
foremost right wing in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political 
projects that seek to achieve it.7 Their right wing politics is further manifested in their 
opposition to social integration of marginalized groups and in their appeal to 
xenophobia. Jan-Werner Müller defines populism as an exclusionary form of identity 
politics that is based on a constructed definition of “the people” which excludes 
minority groups, foreigners and immigrants.8 For Cas Mudde, populism lacks an 
ideology of its own and assimilates ideas from other ideologies so as to capitalize on 
latent economic and political grievances in society. For Mudde, right wing populist 
parties in Europe have largely combined with authoritarianism and nativism, 
considering society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic 
camps. They have created a distinct “us” versus “them” approach using religion and 
culture as the basis for the divide.9 Populist authoritarianism emphasizes “law and 
order” and nativism propagates the idea that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group, presenting foreigners, immigrants and asylum seekers 
as a threat to the homogeneity and identity of the nation-state. Betz observes that 
amid the emergence of a more multicultural and diverse society in Europe, right wing 
populist parties have promoted themselves as the advocates and the guardians of the 
exclusive European national identity.10 They appeal to xenophobia and reject the 
principle of social equality and inclusion based on a civic conception of nationalism. 
                                                 
7 Betz, H. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. The Review of Politics, 55(4). p, 4 
8 Muller, 2 
9 Mudde, 34 
10 Betz, H. (1993) ‘The new politics of resentment: Radical right-wing populist parties in western 
Europe’, Comparative Politics, 25(4), p, 417 
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Their ideology starts from the assumption of basic inequality where the native 
population should come first and have priority over jobs and welfare provisions.  
For political theorist Ernesto Laclau, populism is the very essence of politics 
and its emancipatory force. 11 Populism is the very logic of the political, and therefore 
all politics are by definition, populist.12 For Mudde, populism poses a danger to 
democracy since it requires pluralism and the recognition of finding terms of living 
together as free, equal, but also diverse citizens.13 For Laclau, populism is a radical 
form of democracy and the rise of populism reintroduces conflict into politics and 
mobilizes the excluded sectors of society – ultimately challenging the status quo.  
The populist right has focused much of its political fire on Islam, the religion 
of the majority of the more established migrant populations in Europe, as well that of 
the recent arrivals from war-ravaged countries. These parties have been able to frame 
the question of Islam in terms of their level of integration, their belonging and in the 
context of the larger challenges confronting European identity. Central to right wing 
populist mobilization is the discussion over whether or not Muslims can or should 
even be accorded a permanent place in Western society.14  
1.4 What are the populist parties in Europe? 
The Front National, the Alternative for Germany, the Dutch Freedom Party, 
the Danish People’s Party, the Sweden Democrats, the True Finns, the Swiss People’s 
Party, and the Norwegian Progressive Party, have all made electoral gains in their 
                                                 
11 Laclau, 2005 
12 Laclau, 47 
13 Muller, 3 
14 Wodak, R., Khosravinik, M. and Mral, B. (2014). Right-wing populism in Europe. 1st ed. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing. p, 72 
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electoral polls by almost exclusively focusing on anti-immigration and anti-Islam.15 
Populist right wing parties are also opposed to European cooperation under the EU: 
they are Eurosceptic. Their recent surge in popularity has put immense pressure on 
ruling governments on the assistance of refugees, whether sea rescues, allocation of 
money or permanent re settlement – all of which require cooperation with EU states. 
Concerned over losing popularity to the surging populist movements, mainstream 
parties have emulated their positions on migration and adopted their nationalistic 
rhetoric, in some cases making a significant shift to the right.   
1.5 Implications 
Europe’s handling of the refugee crisis has wide implications beyond the 
impact on the lives of the thousands of people who remain in legal limbo while living 
in makeshift camps, are stranded on the streets of major European cities or held in 
camps in Greece. Since 2011, the war in Syria has created nearly 6 million refugees. 
An additional 1 million people fled the wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
refugees are entitled to protection under international law, as they face death or 
persecution if returned home.16 Meanwhile, millions of refugees remain stranded in 
squalid camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon – developing countries who continue 
to be the hosts of the vast majority of refugees. In that context, Europe’s treatment of 
refugees, apart from being in direct violation of signed agreement, chiefly the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – sets a very low standard for 
cooperation and states’ humanitarian responsibility towards refugees.  
                                                 
15 Ibid, 14 




Refugee and human rights groups have criticized the EU for failing to put in 
place a unified response as well as failing to comply with their own asylum standards 
and signed human rights treaties. Human Rights Watch characterized the EU’s 
response as “dismal” and lacking in leadership, vision and solidarity.17 Roberts et al. 
wrote that Europe’s response had a “preoccupation with numbers” that too often 
ignored the individual treatment of refugees, failing to provide the most basic health 
and safety standards.18 The responsibility to care for asylum seekers was largely left 
to civil society and volunteer organizations. The state abdicated its traditional role. 
For Newland, many governments pursued “the three Ds” of denial, diversion and 
deterrence, with only a few others making some efforts to rescue, protect and find 
ways to share the responsibility.19 The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) noted that a year after the crisis peaked, thousands were still 
sleeping in tents and open areas in freezing temperatures. Thousands of others were 
held in crowded detention centers, awaiting responses to their applications. The 
organization also reported that states were exceedingly slow in fulfilling resettlement 
pledges, with only 6,259 refugees relocated from Greece by December 2016 – less 
than 10 percent of pledged numbers under the EU scheme.20 
1.6 Definitions 
A migrant according to the UNHCR describes any person who moves across 
an international border, to join family members already abroad, in search for work, in 
                                                 
17 See full Human Rights Watch reports: https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/european-union 
18 Roberts, B., Murphy, A. and McKee, M. (2016) ‘Europe’s collective failure to address the refugee 
crisis’, Public Health Reviews, 37(1).  
19 Newland et al, 26 
20 Find more data: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/news/15792 
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the quest for education or for a range of other motivations.21 By contrast, a refugee 
flees armed conflict or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Under international law, 
he or she requires international protection and cannot be returned home. An asylum 
seeker seeks formal protection and cannot be returned to the country they fled from 
while their claims are being considered under the principle of nonrefoulement, or 
nonreturn – a concept imbedded in international and constitutional law.22 
1.7 Case Selection 
In this thesis, I will focus on the ascent of two populist movements in 
Germany and in France and trace their impact on the states’ migration policy. I will 
examine these populist movements’ positions on migration as well as those of the 
mainstream political parties to assess the policy shifts that have taken place. I will 
examine whether the recent surge in the popularity of right wing populism has the 
ability to sway leaders to accommodate their proposals. My project will examine 
whether the success of these right-leaning parties has the ability to directly weaken 
efforts to cope effectively with the refugee crisis. If this is indeed the case, then we 
can expect that their continued popularity is likely to lead to legislation that will 
further restrict access to asylum in European states and endanger social and religious 
freedoms of minority groups in Europe. 
Germany and France merit special attention because they have been the 
driving forces behind the formation of the EU and remain essential to its survival and 
its future. Germany escaped from the Euro Crisis virtually unscathed, maintains a 
                                                 
21 See more: https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44938/migrant-definition 
22 Messina, A. and Lahav, G. (2006). The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies. 1st ed. 
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner. p, 9-11. 
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robust economy and low unemployment rates. Meanwhile France has suffered from 
years of stagnation and has been dogged for years by a high jobless rate. Germany 
and France are both home to a sizeable migrant population and populist parties have 
become powerful in both countries. But populism emerged at different times and 
under different socio-economic situations in the two countries. The electoral fortunes 
of French and German populism have also been different. I intend to show through 
my case selection that while populism may differ in its emergence and success from 
country to country, what remains similar is the ways in which establishment parties 
respond to the threat it poses. My findings should therefore help explain the policy 
shifts on migration that have taken place in other European countries with powerful 
populist parties, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. The French 
and German cases thus provide an opportunity to explore the differences among 
populist-right parties, the nuances within populist thought and the different ways in 
which populism manifests itself. These two cases provide the ways in which 
populism invariably leads to a marked shift to the right in policies on migration, even 
on the part of mainstream parties—representing the center, right and even the left.  
1.8 Two Cases 
 
In Germany a year after Angela Merkel announced an “open border policy” 
for migrants and accepted more than 1 million asylum applications, her party, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was beaten into third place in the 2016 
parliamentary elections. The anti-migrant Alternative for Germany party (AfD) 
garnered about 21 percent of the vote. 23 In response to the rise of the AfD’s 





popularity in the polls and her own sagging approval ratings,24 Merkel began 
advocating strict anti-Islamist measures, such as banning Muslim women from 
donning the full veil in public.25 
 France is home to the prototypical populist right wing party in Europe, the 
National Front (FN), which commands 25 percent of public support, according to 
polls.26 In December 2016 its leader Marine Le Pen said she wanted to block free 
education for illegal immigrants in France, even though such a policy would 
contravene a central French law that guarantees schooling for all children. Despite 
having a one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe, France reluctantly 
agreed to resettle 30,000 after rejecting a permanent quote system, saying, “We won’t 
take any more”27 socialist Prime Minister Manuel Valls said adding, “we cannot 









                                                 
24 See trends and results of German parties: http://pollytix.eu/pollytix-german-election-trend/ 




27 Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0VM0NI 
28 Read: https://euobserver.com/migration/131175 
 
 17 
Chapter 2: The Birth of Europe 
The aftermath of World War II left behind a shattered and impoverished 
continent with unlikely prospects of recovering or avoiding the recurrence of war 
with its neighbors.29 But things changed quickly. In 1951, Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), which brought under joint control the resources necessary 
for making war, and became the first step in European integration. The initial 
motivation was to avoid the relapse of war between France and Germany. But less 
than a decade later, the continent was not only at peace, it was thriving. The 
motivation for further integration shifted towards creating a stronger and more 
prosperous union, rather than simply achieving peace. The success of the ECSC 
prompted leaders to sign more agreements that further developed common economic 
policies and merged their national markets into a single one in which goods, people, 
capital and services could move freely. The system established a common external 
tarrif, in addition to removing tariffs on trade among member states.30 Starting in the 
1970s, more European states joined what was by then referred to as the European 
Community (EC). On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty went into effect, 
establishing the modern-day European Union.  
For Ernst B. Haas, European integration had a self-sustaining dynamic: it 
created the demand for further integration. Integration had a “positive spill-over 
                                                 
29 Read Hitchcock, 2003; Ther, 2016 and Judt, 2005 




effect” where integration in one “functional” area spilled over into other areas.31 And 
so the creation of a common market in one sector, coal and steel, led to incentives for 
the creation of a general common market allowing for free trade in all goods. 
Integration would soon also widen with more European states joining. In the early 
2000s the fast-expanding EU became the world's largest trading bloc.32 It awarded its 
citizens high standards of living exemplified in its generous welfare system and 
affordable medical care. The open border policy, which included the free movement 
of people, goods, services and capital, enabled EU citizens to study, live and work in 
any EU country.33 The Union also brought democracy and a shared prosperity to a 
continent that had been at war since the 16th century. Twelve countries from Central, 
Eastern Europe, as well as formerly communist countries joined the EU in two waves 
of accession in 2004 and 2007 leading to today’s Union composed of 28 member 
states (the UK is due to formally withdraw in 2019). 
The Maastricht Treaty resulted in the creation of the Eurozone, in which 
participants share a common currency, a common central bank and a common 
monetary policy. In the late 1990s, members signed the Schengen Agreement, which 
eliminated border controls among participating states.34 The EU is made up of five 
institutions: the Commission, the Council of ministers, the European Parliament, the 
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors.35 Together, the EU is a cooperative 
                                                 
31 Schmitter, P.C. (2005) ‘Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-Functionalism’ Journal of European 
Public Policy 12/2: 255-272 
32 Find more info: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/ 
33 Bradbury, 20 
34 The 26 members participating in the Schengen agreement are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland 
35 Hitchcock, 447 
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venture in which states agree to give up aspects of their sovereignty in specific areas 
in exchange for participation in these institutions. The EU is not static. It is a 
constantly evolving set of institutions with far-reaching powers, “a web of 
overlapping institutions designed to allow its members to achieve together certain 
objective – security, stability, prosperity – that they could not attain alone.”36 The EU 
passes and enforces laws that affect nearly every aspect of life in Europe: business, 
trade, farming, health and the environment. It has a parliament, a flag, a common 
passport and an anthem.37 And yet, it is not a state or a federation. Since its inception 
integration continued in a largely upward trajectory revealing a steady level of trust 
among states and a majority citizenry who viewed the EU favorably, valuing the 
freedoms it afforded them to easily, travel, work and live throughout Europe.  
2.1 The Euro Crisis  
The year 2009 would prove to be a watershed moment in European history. 
The 2008 crisis that began on Wall Street when the US real-estate bubble burst, 
spilled over into Europe dealing a heavy blow to the common European currency, the 
Euro. Most of the founding EU countries as well as the new members went through 
deep recessions. Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy and Spain were 
disproportionally hit by the crisis. Some post-communist countries also suffered deep 
slumps. Germany as the wealthiest creditor EU state, took charge of resolving the 
crisis. Merkel insisted that bailouts be contingent on severe austerity measures, 
budget cuts and reforms. As a result of these measures, salaries and pensions were 
slashed, unemployment soared and masses were plunged into poverty. It soon became 
                                                 
36 Hitchcock, 435 
37 Ibid  
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clear that a default of any of the most affected states would spark its exit from the 
euro and potentially a domino effect of crises across Europe. For Greece as well as 
some of the other states, membership in the EU not only facilitated the crisis but also 
tied their hands in their ability to resolve it, as they were subjected to high interests 
rates on loans and had no ability to use the tools of monetary policy, such as 
devaluation. Despite showing some signs of recovery, the effects of the crisis still 
linger with sluggish economic growth and persistently high unemployment rates in 
some states, paving the way for populist parties to argue against the merits of 
membership in the EU. It also left behind among citizens a sense of deep distrust in 
EU institutions and a disdain towards the EU’s supranational institutions, above all 
the Commission and the European Central Bank. Disillusionment with the EU 
increased as Europeans’ initial enthusiasm that membership in the union would bring 
a higher standard of living, access to better jobs and economic prosperity, was 
deflated.  
It is on the heels of the Euro crisis, that large flows of asylum seekers began 
arriving on Europe’s shores, creating fertile ground for many new or long-dormant 
populist parties who wanted to bank on general discontent with the EU. They also had 
a renewed opportunity to further rally people around distrust of foreigners, a central 
theme for populists, one in some instances, that has been in the works for years. 
2.2 Migration in Europe – A brief history 
Prior to the end of the World War II, Europe was a significant source of 
emigration to the rest of the world. It was not until after the war that the continent 
gradually shifted to becoming a major destination for immigrants. Starting in the 
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1950s in what became a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in 
Western Europe, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), recruited large 
numbers of low-skilled workers. Though labor migration halted in response to the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, immigration continued in the form of family 
reunifications. Historical and political changes most notably the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989 and the war in the former Yugoslavia would also lead to increased 
migration and asylum applications in many countries in Europe. Migration however 
did not affect all European countries in the same way. Some states, mostly France and 
the UK, who were former colonial powers, regulated and often facilitated the arrival 
of immigrants from their former colonies. While other countries in the EU, like 
Estonia and Slovakia have negligible migrant population.38  
Starting in the early 1980s, in response to increased levels of migration, a rise 
in anti-immigration populist parties alongside official efforts to integrate under the 
EU, leaders began putting in place policies that would limit migration and asylum. 
For William Hitchcock, immigration and asylum policies are inherently tied to the 
process of European integration.39 Leaders recognized that a zone without internal 
controls requires an effective system for managing external borders, common visa 
policies and agreed rules on asylum and immigration. Harmonisation however has 
tended to result in the adoption of the lowest common denominator of national 
policies.40 With some exceptions, the result has been to push policy in a more 
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restrictive direction. As Europe has worked to free up its internal borders to make 
travel and trade easier within the EU, it has tried to make its external border more 
secure. In 1999, EU states put in place the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS), which provided a common minimum standard for the treatment of all 
asylum seekers and applications.41 The focus of the system however was on 
harmonizing standards and procedures. Member states largely resisted centralizing 
asylum policy, as it would have involved surrendering control of their external 
borders, a policy area states have resisted surrendering sovereign responsibility over 
to the union.42 As a result the application of the asylum principles proved uneven 
across the EU, as they became subject to domestic preferences.43
 
Attempts to create 
an effective burden-sharing policy were also met with stiff resistance.  
Europe’s passport-free zone, the Schengen system, frequently hailed the 
bloc’s most significant achievement, was thus accompanied by the strengthening of 
the common external border against migrants and refugees.44 While external borders 
remained under the authority of member states, internal borders were removed in 
order to facilitate the movement of people, to speed the flow of commerce across 
borders, to reduce costs and to boost economic activity. In response to increased 
migratory pressures over the years, states have strengthened their control of their 
external borders to make up for the loss in sovereignty created by the Schengen 
system.45 The internal open borders policy was compensated with an exterior closed 
                                                 
41 See more on CEAS https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/20160713/factsheet_the_common_european_asylum_system_en.pdf 
42 Koremos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 771 
43 Hatton, 10 
44 More on this: http://isj.org.uk/fortress-europe-the-war-against-migrants/ 
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door policy. This approach has been criticized as amounting to the creation of a 
“Fortress Europe,” a restricted, closed continent inhospitable, even hostile to non-
Western immigrants feeling war and economic privation.46 This has contributed to the 
securitized approach to migrants, where the so-called irregular migration of non-EU 
citizens is viewed as a threat to open borders, the EU state’s welfare system and other 
benefits that are exclusive to the citizens of the bloc.  
In the following chapter, I will explain how migration became a hot-button 
political issue in Europe and how the public’s anxiety about the inflow of refugees 
was tapped by right-wing populist parties who, using an anti-Islamic narrative, 
painted refugees as a threat to people’s core concerns: cultural identity, personal 
security and economic well-being. I will also address the increasing influence of 
populist parties in Europe and the extent to which the refugee crisis increased their 
popular appeal and led to policies that restricted or even denied entry to asylum 
seekers. It made a unified EU response to a humanitarian crisis impossible, 
notwithstanding Europe’s commitment to the principle of human rights and the 
international treaties that underpin it. As for the far-right parties, the refugee crisis 
proved to be a boon as they developed slogans, narrative and catchwords designed to 
stir Europeans’ anxieties, which were already substantial given years of successful 




                                                 





Chapter 3: Europe’s Refugee Crisis 
 
Amidst the lack of a unified EU policy on asylum and simmering popular 
resentment towards immigrants, large numbers of people from predominantly Muslim 
countries began landing on Europe’s shores, starting in 2011. Fleeing protracted 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, thousands of men, women and children 
began arriving by boats, which were often not seaworthy and even on foot, attempting 
to enter Europe. Given their Mediterranean coastlines, Greece and Italy received the 
bulk of arrivals. The EU law governing asylum is the Dublin Regulation, which 
assigns responsibility for processing asylum application to the state of first entry.47 
That state is charged with providing protection to asylum seekers and processing their 
applications in order to prevent asylum “shopping”, where applicants, given Europe’s 
open borders, can move about the EU in search for the best asylum offer.48 A major 
criticism of the Dublin Regulation is the absence of burden sharing provisions to 
prevent EU border states, such as Greece and Italy, of being saddled with 
disproportionate responsibility compared to the northern states. The principle of 
solidarity among EU states, a founding principle, was meant to ensure collective 
action based on the concept of shared values and responsibilities. All states, 
especially the wealthier northern ones, were expected to admit their fair share of 
asylum seekers.  
But as thousands continued to pour into mainland Greece and the Greek 
islands, the northern EU states offered little support. Aid groups who rushed to 
                                                 
47 Find more info: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-
applicants_en 
48 Fratzke, Susan. 2015. Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System. Brussels: 
Migration Policy Institute Europe.  
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provide humanitarian assistance to the newly arriving refugees criticized European 
governments for failing to process people quickly and effectively, and for corralling 
them in makeshift tent camps or crowded facilities that offered limited access to 
healthcare and basic sanitary standards. Trust began to erode among states as 
countries like Germany, France and Sweden, states with large migrant populations 
and a history of admitting refugees, were only willing to settle relatively limited 
numbers of people. They also insisted that Greece continue to host the majority of 
asylum seekers, prompting its Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras to declare that Greece 
had become a “giant holding pen.”49 Refugees were drawn to the more affluent 
European states, especially Germany and Sweden, either because of family 
connections or because they believed that these countries would be more hospitable 
and offer better work opportunities. This logic was not lost on these two states, which 
balked at having to take in a disproportionate number of migrants or at the principle 
of allowing asylum seekers to decide where they would settle. In September 2015, 
German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said refugees should not be able to 
choose where to settle: “We can't allow [them] to freely choose where they want to 
stay – that's not the case anywhere in the world.”50 One of the results of this was that 
in Greece, asylum seekers were packed into an abandoned former airport terminal in 
Athens, crammed into an indoor stadium or slept rough in the city’s central squares.51 
EU members accused Greece of not registering new arrivals properly and allowing 
them to travel north.  
                                                 
49 See full article http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/greece-now-a-giant-migrant-holding-pen-
mntv66tpwm9 
50 See full article http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-
idUSKCN0RD0GP20150913 
51 See full article http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-idUSKCN0W51WT 
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3.1 Sea Rescues 
Though Europe did not lack the economic, social and political capability, it 
largely failed to put in a place a coherent response to migrant arrivals, long before a 
crisis arose. A cooperative policy on managing the flows of people would have 
avoided the chaos that gave rise to the notion of people storming borders and shores 
by the thousands and of governments lacking the capabilities to deal with them. From 
a humanitarian perspective, most of the asylum seekers originated from the top ten 
migrant producing countries52 and thus were entitled to protection under international 
law.53 Instead, Europeans regarded asylum seekers with suspicion, referring to them 
as imposters, irregulars, illegals and economically-motivate migrants. In the absence 
of legal and safe channels to access asylum, desperate refugees often paid hefty sums 
to people smugglers who would then force them onto unseaworthy and overcrowded 
rubber boats for their journey. These vessels would often capsize during stormy 
weather or smugglers would deliberately sabotage them, in order to prompt a nearby 
ship to rescue them. Deaths at sea became frequent, but states were hesitant to 
respond even in the face of widely publicized human tragedy.   
Though drownings at sea became common as early as 2011, no coherent 
policies were put in place until October 2013, when more than 360 migrants died after 
their boat sank near the Italian island of Lampedusa, causing international outrage. 
The Italian government of then-prime minister Enrico Letta established Mare 
Nostrum, a robust search-and-rescue naval operation. Supported by a budget of $12 
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million a month, large navy vessels rescued people just outside Libyan waters. The 
operation, financed entirely by the Italian government, may have saved at least 
130,000 lives.54 But a year later the Italian government shut down Mare Nostrum, 
citing that it would not be able to shoulder the cost alone, to little objection by EU 
states. Not only did other EU states refuse to help fund the program, they alleged that 
it was counterproductive. The UK government argued that sea rescues served as a 
“pull factor,” encouraging more migrants to attempt the sea crossing55 – effectively 
saying that letting migrants drown would discourage others from making the perilous 
voyage. Sea rescues also proved contentious in Italy. Maurizio Gasparri, a member of 
the Senate and of the center-right Forza Italia party claimed that Mare Nostrum had 
become a “taxi service” for migrants.56 An opinion poll showed that a third of Italians 
believed that migrants should be abandoned at sea.57 
Mare Nostrum was replaced by an EU border control mission named Triton, 
which rights groups pointed out, would lead to more deaths at sea because it had a 
smaller budget and lacked a search-and-rescue mandate, charged instead with 
patrolling and policing the waters. It had fewer ships and a smaller area of operation 
that remained close to the Italian coast – far from where most of the shipwrecks 
happen. Still, the refugees kept coming. The year 2014 recorded the highest number 
of migrants trying to reach Europe, the International Organization on Migration said 
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in a report. By September of that year, it also recorded the highest number of 
fatalities, with 3,279 deaths.58 In two separate incidents in September 2014, at least 
700 migrants drowned. In the worst incident, 500 migrants were believed to have died 
after traffickers deliberately rammed and sunk their boat off the coast of Malta, 
reportedly after an altercation with people on board.59 The year 2015 would prove 
even deadlier: 3,784 refugees died while attempting to cross waters to reach European 
shores. On 19 April 2015 the deadliest known shipwreck involving migrants 
occurred: over 900 men, women and children drowned after their boat sank off the 
coast of Libya. European leaders introduced the term migrant crisis after the incident. 
The shipwreck, which had sent shockwaves around the world, also drew criticism of 
the decision to scale back rescue operations as it had led to a rise in migrant deaths 
without reducing their numbers. In response, EU leaders met in an emergency session 
and proposed doubling the size of the EU search and rescue operation, but the result 
was an operation that was still smaller and less well funded operation than Mare 
Nostrum.60 Consequently, 5,098 migrants died at sea in 2016—an all time record.61 
Why did the EU fail to put in place legal and safe pathways for people to seek 
asylum in Europe? And why was the rescue of migrants at sea a politically charged 
topic? The reasons lie squarely in the anti-immigrant sentiment advanced up by 
populist right wing parties.  
Populist leaders like Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Nigel Farage all 
launched aggressive campaigns denouncing mainstream parties’ inadequate responses 
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to the refugee crisis and suggested that these parties would admit large numbers of 
refugees, to detrimental consequences. They also campaigned against the refugees. In 
2015 Le Pen said migrants bring filth, crime, poverty and Islamic terrorism. In 
response to the picture of Aylan Kurdi, a 3 year-old Syrian Kurdish boy whose 
lifeless body washed up Turkey’s shore after the migrant boat he was on capsized, 
drowning his mother and brother, Le Pen suggested it was simply a ploy to 
manipulate European feelings of guilt. France is about to be “submerged” in a 
“terrifying” wave of migrants who represent only a “burden” she said.62  
Echoing a similar message, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said, “actually, most 
people that are coming from those countries, whether they’re coming into Europe or 
coming to America are basically economic migrants. “And it’s mixed in with some of 
those that you potentially get terrorists. I do think the word refugee gets misused.”63 
Nigel’s UKIP party stunned in 2014 election winning nearly 27 percent of the vote, 
up from 16 percent in 2009.64 The leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, Geert Wilders, 
went even further calling the flow of refugees an “Islamic invasion.”65 “Masses of 
young men in their twenties with beards singing Allahu Akbar across Europe. It’s an 
invasion that threatens our prosperity, our security, our culture and identity,” he said. 
“We have to close our borders for all asylum seekers and all immigrants from Islamic 
countries.”  





64 Find more stats: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-
2009.html 
65 Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-netherlands-idUSKCN0RA0WY20150910 
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Citizens picked up on these anti-immigrant messages and thousands took to 
the streets to protest in major cities in France, Britain, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia demanding an end to the 
resettlement of refugees.66 Though there were sizeable counter protests in support of 
refugees, they were vastly outnumbered by those calling for closing the borders. 
But how do statements and messages advanced by populist leaders that paint 
migrants as dangerous, and a threat to the economy, jobs and popular culture lead to 
policy changes? In the next section I will show how these messages not only affect 
public opinion, but also mainstream leaders who co-opt their ideas in an effort to hold 
on to their legitimacy and position in power.  
3.2 Populism in Europe 
Populism was absent from European politics during the first decades of the 
post World War II period, as it had strong connections with the xenophobia and 
violence of the war and reminiscent of Nazism and Fascism.67 Starting in the late 
1980s, however, xenophobia made a comeback. Several populist parties became 
strong political forces as a nationalist backlash began against the speed and the extent 
of EU integration, ignited by public fear that national sovereignty would be eroded. It 
was also a response to a marked rise in immigration.68 The Front National (FN) was 
the first to post an electoral success when it won 9.9 percent of the votes in the 1986 
French parliamentary election. In 1990 the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) led by 
Jörg Haider won 16.6 percent in the parliamentary elections. In Switzerland, the 
                                                 
66 Read: http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/06/europe/europe-anti-migrant-protests/ 
67 Mudde 2017, 33-34 




Automobile Party won 10 seats in Parliament in 1991. In Belgium, the Vlaam Blok, a 
Flemish regionalist party won 12 seats that same year. The Swedish Democrats won 
6.8 percent of the vote in 1991 and 25 parliamentary seats. The Danish Progress Party 
won 9 percent of the vote in 1988 general election, while the Norwegian Progress 
party became the country’s third largest party with 13 percent of the vote in 1989. 
Though founded in different times, under different circumstances and with different 
ideologies – all populist parties in Europe devote high salience to immigration policy. 
They have successfully politicised immigration and have called for limiting and even 
reversing the number of foreigners in their country.  
Electoral studies have focused primarily on the “demand side,” on the ideal 
breeding ground for populism and emphasized such catalysts as economic crises or 
increases in migration. Yet the “supply” side, the leaders and parties, have received 
less attention. In this thesis, I argue that fertile ground is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the rise of populist right wing parties.69 I focus on the populist leaders 
themselves who deftly cultivate economic and social circumstances around them in 
order to advance their agenda. A fertile ground thus does not automatically lead to 
populism. Instead, right wing populism is the result of the deliberate work of right 
wing populist leaders who create and develop a narrative of a majority population that 
is afraid and whose identity and personal safety is threatened by mass migration.70 
This narrative, which presents itself as common sense, has been met with widespread 
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approval. In this thesis, I will carefully describe and analyze this constructed 
narrative. 
Since the 1980s, as a result of the arrival of labor migrants, family unifications 
and refugees from various parts of the world, European societies have become 
multicultural.71 The populist right began to translate this change as a threat to 
European identity and to its welfare system. For Müller, opposition to migration is 
due to the fact that populism is by definition an exclusionary form of politics that 
creates a distinct identity of “the people.”72 For a political party or movement to be 
populist, it must identify a part of the people as the real people.73 Excluded are 
minority groups, immigrants and “illegal migrants.” Populism creates a distinct us 
versus them. In Europe the people are the majority white “native” Christian citizens 
of Europe. Minorities, notably migrants and refugees, constitute the other. Not only is 
the people one homogenous group, “them” are also one monolithic camp. For Cas 
Mudde, populism in Europe relies on nativism, which demands for states to be 
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group, the people and non-natives 
fundamentally threaten the homogeneity of the nation state.74 Thus the xenophobic 
element in European populism derives from a very specific conception of the nation, 
which relies on a religious, cultural and some instances an ethnic definition of the 
people.  
The political science literature on immigration tells us very little about the 
origins of xenophobia. Instead, it supposes that this sentiment is almost a natural 
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outcome produced by immigrants’ characteristics, which differ greatly from that of 
the majority population. Under this conception difference inevitably leads to tensions, 
fear and a loss of cultural identity among host citizens.75 I take on the immigration 
studies insight, which explains xenophobia as a social and political construction. It 
has a dialectical relationship between the self and the other, premised on the negative 
conception of the other. Xenophobia is therefore not a social phenomenon or a 
consequence of the cultural difference between immigrants and host citizens. Instead, 
it is the result of a deliberate framing of foreigners and immigrants by political 
leaders that stresses on an us versus them distinction and agitates fear, a loss of 
control and identity in the face of the arrival of the other. The intensity or the degree 
of negative sentiment held by a population depends on the charisma and the ability of 
these parties and movements to sell their narrative.  
3.3 On Identity 
Right wing populists have framed the question of migration as a threat to main 
culture, values and identity, creating social problem and a crisis that must be dealt 
with on the national policy level. This has allowed these parties to present themselves 
as defenders of national identities and the larger European identity.76 For Slavoj 
Zizek, immigration is always articulated as a driver of tensions between people who 
are supposedly different. “What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession 
of the national thing. The ‘other’ wants to steal our enjoyment by ruining our ‘way of 
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life’.”77 Populists’ central argument is that their political mobilization against 
migration is part of a larger fight for the preservation and defense of European 
identity. Identity on the one hand signifies belonging to a certain place or people. On 
the other, it requires difference. “We cannot know who we are unless we know who 
we are not.”78  
The most effective tactic has been the introduction of a zero sum dynamic of 
both material resources and European identity. This involves the notion that there is 
an ongoing competition for material prosperity and cultural self-determination 
between European natives and perceived outsiders, and that what one group gains the 
other loses. This stance assumes that prosperity and identity are finite resources that 
the majority group should have privileged access to. Sharing them leads to a 
disintegration of values and resources and a risk of losing them altogether. National 
society should be aggressively protected, the flow of migrants must be stopped or 
reversed and integration must become more rigid and forceful.79 Populists also play 
on fear: fear of losing the self, majority culture and identity. Fear thus plays an 
important role in homogenizing the in-group and polarizing the relationship towards 
the out-group. 
The European sense of identity and conception of difference emerge most 
clearly at the continent’s borders and in its encounters with those defined as non-
European. Given that the physical borders of the EU have changed over the decades 
incorporating more states, the definition of who is in Europe and who is out has been 
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less clear. What does it mean to be European? For the average European citizen, there 
are two Europes, one cultural and the other political. Cultural Europe is a broad 
concept rooted historically and culturally in Christianity. Political Europe refers to the 
EU as a bureaucratic system, which affords citizens legal rights and responsibilities. 
The boundaries of cultural and political Europe however increasingly overlap, leading 
inevitably to tensions between the two concepts. This became visible in the debates 
about Turkey joining the EU. Those in favor of Turkish membership defined the EU 
in largely political terms as a post-nationalist and constitutional entity. As long as 
Turkey implements human rights, democratic rule and market economy there cannot 
be principled objections against its EU membership. In contrast, many opponents 
invoked cultural visions of a Europe as a distinct civilization united by Christianity. 
As a result, a predominantly Muslim country could never qualify for EU membership, 
no matter how secular its political system.80 
3.4 Migrants and Islam 
Populism’s antagonism against migrants has evolved over the years. Who is 
defined as a foreigner in the first place has evolved as well as have the negative 
messages associated with migration. In recent years, much of the anti-immigration 
rhetoric has been directed against Muslims and their religion, Islam, which is 
presented as a threat to western way of life. Muslims are not, however, the first 
minority group to be targeted by populists. For Ruth Wodak, some patterns of anti-
Semitic prejudices in Europe have been repurposed and applied to other ethnic 
groups, mostly Muslims but also the Roma. The populist right has also sharpened and 
                                                 




modified their messages to align with contemporary issues. Today, they have a wide 
repertoire of anti-Muslim ideas and arguments in the context of an overarching 
hypernationalist anti-immigration narrative that singles out Islam as the new 
existential other of European identity.81 I argue that to the populist right, the other can 
be contextualized and replaced, and what matters is having and maintaining a group 
of people who are defined as such.   
Islam is the religion of most migrants in Europe. The established migrant 
population came from Turkey, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Africa 
starting in the 1950s, in contrast to the more recent arrivals since 2011 from Syria, 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In total, there are now over 13 million Muslims living in the 
EU.82 As the largest and most obvious minority group, Muslims have in recent years 
been singled out as the other in relation to native European citizens. The populist right 
treats Muslims in Europe as a singular, undifferentiated group whose members are all 
the same, denying that they have arrived in different times, come from different 
countries, under different circumstance and have differing levels attachment to their 
religion. An anti-Islam that targets all Muslims has become a major part of the 
rhetoric of most populist leaders, as witness for example by the 2017 main campaign 
slogan of Dutch leader Geert Wilders, STOP ISLAM.83 He along with others, have 
successfully introduced the debate of whether Muslim immigrants ought to be 
admitted to Europe in the first place and whether the Muslim population, painted as 
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all being religious fanatics, can or should be accorded a permanent place in Western 
society. The debate, which has created a great deal of animosity and has offended 
Muslims from all walks of life, has given right wing parties significant publicity that 
has gained them voters as a large segment of public opinion has identified with their 
message. This in turn has given the populist right the opportunity to further mobilize 
people on the issue.  
In Italy, Greece and Poland, more than half of respondents in a 2014 poll 
reported having negative attitudes towards Muslims.84 A 2016 poll by the Ipsos Mori 
research group found that many people in the EU grossly over-estimate the size of the 
Muslim population in their countries. In France the average over-estimation was 31 
percent, whereas the actual figure is 7.5 percent. 85 Germans, Italians and Belgians 
likewise overestimated the size of the Muslim population in their country. The same 
poll found that most citizens also overestimate the growth of Muslim populations. 
The average estimation in France was that by 2020, 40 percent of the population 
would be Muslim, when the actual projection is 8.3 percent. Italy, Belgium and 
Germany also grossly overestimated the growth of the Muslim population and had an 
inflated view of the proportion of the national population that would be accounted for 
by Muslims.  
This exaggerated perception of the Muslim population’s size and a 
preoccupation with their fertility rates can be traced back to the discourse advanced 
by populist leaders. Unlike policies on economy or trade, which are complicated and 
have little perceptible effect on the lives of regular citizens, migration has direct and 
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obvious effects on the daily lives of citizens. It involves working alongside foreign 
individuals, sharing public institutions, public parks and neighborhoods with them. It 
means living alongside Muslims, who are perceived as acting differently, the more so 
because they speak a different language and adhere to different customs and 
sometimes even dress differently. Populist leaders pick up on these differences and 
translate them into a problem, a threat even a crisis that must be acted upon 
immediately with drastic measures. Rejecting accusations of racism, they reference 
differences and incompatibility in religion, cultural backgrounds, values and identity. 
Pointing out the differences between Muslims and majority culture in Europe serve as 
a justification for the radical right wing’s policies of exclusion. These parties and 
movements emphasize Europe’s supposed homogeneity and of the importance of 
preserving it amidst the threat of what they present as contamination. They paint 
Muslims as people radically different from Europeans—as backward, lazy and 
inimical to modernity and democracy. Natives by contract are pure, innocent and 
hardworking people who are faced with Muslim migrants who want to  “Islamize” 
and take over Europe by building many more mosques, minarets and halal butcher 
shops. Their sheer growing presence will be exemplified through the increase of 
women donning headscarves, speaking another language, practicing a different 
culture and simply looking “different.” For the populist right, Muslim citizens can 
never belong to Europe, no matter how many years or generations they have lived 
there, as their religion disqualifies them. 
Populist leaders present themselves as the lone defenders of the authentic 
Europe that supposedly existed before the advent of Muslim migrants. They claim to 
 
 39 
be able to take their nations back to the halcyon era when they where inhabited 
exclusively by people wedded to a common culture. In addition to propagating this 
myth, they purport to defend liberal values and secular law.86 Stressing the supposed 
homogeneity of the majority group, many populist parties also take on a distinct 
authoritarian dimension, arguing that immigrants must either follow local rules or 
“get out of the country.”87 But for the nativist right, Muslim immigrations lack both 
the ability and the willingness to assimilate because Islam itself is entirely 
incompatible with the principles of Western civilization.88 Muslims are not only 
incapable and unwilling to assimilate; their very presence poses a treat to western 
values and culture, which renders efforts to integrate Muslim migrants not only futile 
but also dangerous.  
Populists promote the idea that Islam is not solely a religion but also a 
totalitarian ideology that is at odds with western liberal way of life. Some have gone 
so far as to compare Islam to Nazism. Wilders, for instance, called for banning the 
Quran on the grounds that like Hitler’s Mein Kampf, it is the source of a fascist 
ideology that incites death and destruction. And that it wants to kill everything they 
stand for in a modern western democracy.89 Wilders thus charges that he is not racist, 
rather it is Muslims who are intolerant. Over the years, the nativist right has advanced 
numerous ideas, demands and policy proposals that would impede and ultimately 
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reverse the integration of Muslims in Western European society. The intent of these 
initiatives has been to render Muslims and Islam itself invisible.90 
3.5 Securitization and 9/11 
The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, followed by the 2004 
Madrid train bombings added a securitization element to policies on asylum in 
general, and to Muslim migrants and migration from Muslim countries in particular.91 
The Paris attacks in 2015, Brussels suicide bombings, Nice truck attack and Berlin 
Christmas markets attack in 2016 perpetrated by Muslims in the name of the Islamic 
State, have all strengthened support for the right wing populists who were quick to 
capitalize on the attacks as proof of the need to keep out Muslims refugees and to 
restrict the freedom of Muslim population in Europe. But though the populist right 
has been a strong supporter of strict anti-terrorism legislation even before 9/11, the 
post-9/11 securitization of politics in Europe was broadly supported within the 
political mainstream and therefore did not require their approval. Right wing 
populists however seized on the fear of terrorism to make the case that Islam is itself 
a violent religion and that every Muslim citizen of Europe or asylum seeker is 
therefore a potential terrorist.92 By creating a deep suspicion of Muslims as a group, 
the populists advanced the idea that as a religion and an ideology, Islam must be 
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3.6 Bans on Burqas, Minarets and Headscarves 
The anti-Islamic policies espoused by populists are not simply rhetoric or an 
electoral strategy. They have led to government policies that have targeted the 
freedoms of Muslims in Europe. The most recent case was March 17, 2017, when the 
Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that companies could ban staff from wearing Islamic 
headscarves and other visible religious symbols.93 The case involved a Belgian firm 
that had dismissed a Muslim receptionist for wearing a headscarf. In its ruling, the 
ECJ found that company regulations banning political, philosophical or religious 
signs did not constitute direct discrimination so long as such prohibitions applied to 
religious garb from all faiths such as Sikh turbans and Jewish skullcaps.94 In 
Germany, the AfD party welcomed the ruling. “The ECJ’s ruling sends out the right 
signal, especially for Germany,” the party’s Berlin leader Georg Pazderski said. “Of 
course companies have to be allowed to ban the wearing of headscarves,” 95 he added.  
Restrictions on Muslim women’s headdress have been a subject of intense 
debate in Europe for a long time. Back in 1989, two Muslim female students in 
France were suspended from their public middle school for refusing to remove their 
headscarves, sparking a controversy on freedom of religion, expression and the 
French principle of secularism. In 2004, France passed a law that banned all religious 
symbols from official state institutions. Though the law applied to all symbols such as 
Christian crosses and Jewish skullcaps, it was largely regarded as specifically 
                                                 
93 Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-court-headscarf-idUSKBN16L0V9 
94 Read: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/europe/headscarves-ban-european-court.html 




targeting Muslim women’s’ headscarves.96 The ruling led to many EU countries to 
follow suit with similar legislation that rights groups have said violate religious 
freedom.97  
In 2009, a majority of Swiss citizens voted in favor of a referendum promoted 
by the far right SVP party to ban the construction of minarets in the country.98 The 
success of the vote was largely due to the campaign that aggressively promoted the 
idea that the presence of Muslims personified by the minarets of mosques, poses an 
imminent threat to Swiss national culture and values. This narrative resonated 
strongly with average citizens, as 57.5 percent voted in favor of the proposal. 
Campaign posters depicted a Swiss flag with sprouting black, missile-shaped minarets 
and a woman donning a niqab, a full-face veil that showed only her eyes. Oskar 
Freysiger, a member of the SVP party and a parliamentarian, said that minarets were 
a “symbol of a political and aggressive Islam. The minute you have minarets in 
Europe it means that Islam will have taken over.” 99 
In 2010, France and Belgium voted in favor of nationwide restrictions on 
wearing the burqa in public places. France was the first country to ban the full-face 
veil in public spaces in April 2011. The penalty for the offense is $205 and being 
forced by the court to take a class on French values.100 Belgium followed suit making 
it an offense punishable by a $197 fine or up to seven days in jail.101 The bill was 
passed almost unanimously in the Belgian parliament, with lawmakers citing security 
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reasons for the ban, and claiming the veil is a tool of oppression.102 The European 
Court of Human Rights upheld the bans in 2014, rejecting arguments that outlawing 
full-face veils breached religious freedom. 103  
Taken together, these measures demonstrate the far right’s success in 
mobilizing public opinion against Muslim symbols in Europe and the extent of its 
political clout. They were successful even when they did not do well in election, 
making their achievement all the more remarkable. It also provides insights into 
majority opinion on Islam in Europe and the legalization of public restrictions on 
Islamic spaces and symbols of faith in an otherwise liberal Europe. This shows that 
these restrictions are no longer peculiar to far right movements and are being 
endorsed by mainstream ideologies.104   
3.7 “Mainstreaming” 
For Aristotle Kallis, extreme ideas against Muslims have a life cycle, from 
politically and socially marginal to established mainstream recognition.105 Though the 
mainstreaming is gradual, it is also powerful and infectious, revealing the 
vulnerability of average citizens to negative messages. According to Kallis, right 
wing populism taps into a concealed social demand for policies that suppress minority 
groups. This demand is very receptive to external confirmation “nudges” that can 
activate and even further radicalize people. A successful message not only reinforces 
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similar preexisting stereotypes, it liberates them from the notion that such ideas are 
taboo and therefore not part of public conversation.106   
Kallis suggests that relying on the electoral support of the populist right alone 
as a measure of their success obscures how their ideas have succeeded in shaping a 
new, broader and social common sense that is accepted by a wider population.107 
Looking at the election results of the 2007 French elections for instance, which I will 
analyze at length in my case study on France, awarded Jean Marie Le Pen 10 percent 
of the vote in the first round of elections and was hailed as ushering in a decline of the 
FN party. Yet a significant proportion of voters who abandoned the FN in 2007 were 
attracted by the anti-immigration rhetoric of Nicolas Sarkozy who successfully 
mainstreamed FN’s ideas, which were previously considered radical. A central aim of 
this thesis is to highlight how mainstream leaders’ alleged desire to address the 
relevant concerns of the people, or their concern over losing voters produces a win-
win scenario for far-right populist parties: either they succeed in the election by 
winning a large margin ushering them and their ideas into the mainstream, or, 
mainstream parties will emulate their policies. In either case, their ideas succeed.  
For João Carvalho, mainstream parties pick up policy ideas on migration that 
were advanced by the populist right and gained traction through a political process he 
terms, “co-option,”108 the incorporation of policy proposals of challenger groups so as 
to undercut their appeal and increase the non-populists parties’ electoral prospects. 
Established parties adopt populist proposals in order to enhance their position and 
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recapture voters lost to opposition parties. Gianpietro Mazzoleni speaks of the 
“populist contamination” of mainstream political discourse. His argument is not that 
all political parties in Europe have essentially become populist parties, but that most 
parties use populist themes in their political platforms.109 Carvalho sees co-option as a 
reflection of right wing parties’ influence in domestic politics. Influence should 
therefore be understood as the ability to promote a particular outcome rather than 
electoral support. Co-option is also a strategy employed by mainstream parties to 
neutralize challengers. Mainstream parties that embrace stricter migration procedures 
often gain back support lost to populists, but at the expense of the rights of minority 
migrant populations and of asylum seekers.  
There are many examples. In January 2017, a few weeks before their national 
elections, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the liberal People’s party for Freedom 
and Democracy (PVV), published an open letter in the Dutch newspapers targeted at 
immigrants. He said anyone who cannot respect customs should simply leave. Those 
who “refuse to adapt and criticize our values” should “behave normally, or go 
away,”110 Rutte said in the full-page newspaper.111 He said the Dutch were 
increasingly uncomfortable with those who abused the freedoms they enjoyed after 
coming to the Netherlands, who “harass gays, or whistle at women in short skirts, or 
brand ordinary Dutch people as racists.” He added that the solution was “not to paint 
everyone with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups” but to “make it crystal 
clear what is normal, and what is not normal in our country. We must actively defend 
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our values.” Wilders shot back saying that the prime minister is weak and accused 
him of being a “copy cat” – imitating his policies on national identity and migration. 
Though establishment parties copying of populist proposals could limit their electoral 
losses or even make electoral gains, the effects are variable and could lead to favoring 
the right.112 Copying often also legitimizes the themes of the populist right and 
increases their influence.  
On March 15, 2017, Rutte’s party won with 21 percent of the vote. “It is an 
evening in which the Netherlands after Brexit, after the American elections said stop 
to the wrong kind of populism,”113 said in his victory speech. Wilders’ PVV party 
won 13 percent and a third more seats than in the last election, becoming the second 
largest party in the Netherlands. “We were the third largest party of the Netherlands. 
Now we are the second largest party. Next time we will be number one,” Wilders 
defiantly said. Though pro-EU leaders hailed Rutte’s victory as a win for mainstream 
parties, observers note that Rutte only won after accommodating Wilders’ ideas on 
migration. Ten years ago, Wilders was largely regarded as a raging, fear mongering 
extremist whose proposals to ban the construction of new mosques in the 
Netherlands, were ridiculous. Today, not only has he himself succeeded in stepping 
into the mainstream, his ideas have become the law of the land, embraced by the 
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Chapter 4: Case Study Germany 
 
Although the emergence of populism in Europe coincides with the arrival of 
migrants in the postwar period, it was hardly the case that migration, even sudden, 
necessarily produced populism. Instead, populists advance their authoritarian and 
nativist political agenda by claiming that the presence of migrants could lead to job 
losses among the citizens of receiving countries as well as a loss of cultural and 
national identity. Some of the literature on populist parties and movements points to 
economic crises and high unemployment rates as reasons behind rising support for 
them. But the economic argument alone fails to explain the rise in Germany of a 
hostile attitude towards foreigners, especially given that Germany has had over the 
decades relatively low unemployment rates and a faster growing economy than that of 
its neighbors.114 It would thus be misleading to reduce populism to migration-driven 
economic anxieties and ignore the more emotive element of identity politics. 
When the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, most 
Germans sought to break with their Nazi past. Because of the legacy of the Third 
Reich, nascent right wing populist parties have been stigmatised and linked in the 
public mind with an ideology that brought death and horror to millions of 
Europeans.115 Yet certain political attitudes from that period continue to linger and 
large segments of the German population have proven to be susceptible to various 
racist appeals.116 Starting in 1964, some 40 right wing parties have formed in 
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Germany. In 1989, the Republikaner Party (REP) entered the Berlin parliament with 
7.5 percent of the vote, 117  becoming the first right wing populist party to clear the 
hurdle that required parties to get the 5 percent of the vote at minimum to gain seats 
in the Bundestag.118 REP, which called for stopping all Muslim migration into 
Germany, argued that Muslims were opposed to democracy, were militant and 
murderous against non-Islamic believers. At the time, there were 2.4 million Muslims 
in Germany, representing 3 percent of the German population.119 Despite the 
relatively small population, REP leaders promoted the idea that Muslims were 
working towards establishing an Islamic society in Germany and their presence is a 
biological, social and cultural threat to Germany.120 By the early 1990s REP lost 
momentum and popularity amid scandals, tactical mistakes and anti-Semitic remarks 
involving party leaders, which did not resonate well with voters, leading to a sharp 
decline in their support.121 
4.1 Immigration to Germany 
The migration of Muslims in Germany dates back to the1960s. Faced with 
labor shortages in the country’s post-war rebuilding efforts, Germany began 
recruiting foreign workers on a large scale. Faced with acute labor shortages and 
declining birth rates, Germany recruited Gastarbeiter, guest workers from southern 
Europe but also from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, three predominantly Muslim 
countries. Foreign labor became a major resource for the reconstruction of the 
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country’s infrastructure. But recruitment ended in 1973 in response to the oil crisis 
and the ensuing economic recession. Though many workers returned home, a 
significant number chose to stay and benefitted from a family reunification provision 
in the law that allowed immigrants to be joined by family members, including wives 
and children. The foreign presence in Germany was thus transformed from temporary 
single male workers living in allocated housing, to that of foreign families who attend 
schools, bought homes, opened businesses and used public institutions. Today, 
Germany is home to 4.7 million Muslims122 and has the largest Muslim population in 
Europe. They make up almost 6 percent of the population.  
The German but also in the Austrian discussion on race, integration and 
migration, has had an emphasis on the alleged biological differences between natives 
and foreigners. This outlook is rooted in Nazi ideology, which stressed the alleged 
genetic and racial superiority of the Aryan race. Some populist leaders have advanced 
similar theories that migrants, Muslims specifically, are inferior beings for reasons 
rooted in their nature. These parties have portrayed Muslims as not only unwilling to 
integrate, but incapable of it because of insurmountable cultural and religious 
differences imbedded in their genes.123 This claim, apart from being scientifically 
unfounded and reminiscent of a dark period in German history, has been put forward 
by some populist parties as backed by science, and thus factual, even objective. 
4.2 Sarrazin controversy 
A controversy in 2010 demonstrated how in Germany the irrational 
preoccupation with race and racial disparities between people remains prevalent 
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among politicians and average Germans. Former state finance minister of Berlin and 
member of the Social Democrat Party (SDP) Thilo Sarrazin released a book in which 
he argued that Muslims undermine German society, sponge off the state and could 
swamp the country due to their higher birth rate.124 The book warned that Muslim 
immigrants, who Sarrazin claimed are less intelligent than native Germans, were 
destroying the country’s identity. According to the book, Muslims are unwilling and 
incapable of integrating into the mainstream because of their genetics. The book 
entitled Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany does away with itself) sold 1.5 million 
copies and became the most successful non-fictional book in post-war-German 
history. “I don't need to accept anyone who lives off the state, rejects this country... 
and is always producing little girls with headscarves. This is true of 70 percent of the 
Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population of Berlin,” he said in an interview.125 
Though the book appalled many people, an online poll by the Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger 
daily taken during the ensuing controversy, showed that a third of all respondents 
supported Sarrazin’s claims. A further 43 percent found his words “exaggerated in 
some cases but believed that he was right about many things.” Another survey in Die 
Welt showed that over two-thirds felt criticism of Sarrazin was unjustified.126 
The chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), of which Sarrazin was a 
member, initially supported an attempt to expel him but backtracked when it became 
clear that a large proportion of SPD members sympathized with his arguments. Just a 
few weeks after announcing that Sarrazin’s denigration of Muslims was “completely 
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unhelpful,” 127 German Chancellor Angela Merkel also backtracked. In a speech to the 
youth members of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, she declared that 
Germany's attempt to create a multicultural society had “utterly failed.”128 “We lied to 
ourselves for a while saying that they [foreign workers] won’t stay, and they will 
disappear again one day. This is not the reality,” she said. “This multicultural 
approach, saying that we simply live side-by-side and are happy about each other,” 
she added... has failed, utterly failed.”129 
4.3 Multiculturalism  
Multikulti or multiculturalism is much talked about in Germany and is also a 
focus of heated debates on the merits and dangers of integrating foreigners into 
German society. Introduced in the 1980s by Christian officials, the term was seized 
by populist leaders not as an expression of tolerance, but as evidence of German 
resignation to the threat posed to their national identity by foreign immigration.130 
Multiculturalism in this context means the unwillingness of foreigners to ingrate into 
German society and the failure of officials to devise and to enforce stricter rules that 
would oblige them to integrate. The definition of integration remains up for debate in 
Germany as well as in other parts of Europe. Populist parties in Germany have not 
offered a more concrete definition but have specifically pointed to the exercise of 
Islamic cultural and religious practices as signs that immigrants are not integrated. 
The AfD says that it ought to involve “more than just learning German.” Populist 
parties instead envisage multiculturalism’s negation, homogeneity as a utopia of the 
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pure nation-state. The essence of internal homogenization is captured in the infamous 
slogan of German right-wing extremists: Germany for the German’s, foreigners out! 
Not only should the people of our nation rule our states, we should be its exclusive 
inhabitants.131 Like mainstream leaders in France, instead of challenging such ideas, 
German establishment politicians have embraced the extreme right wing definitions 
of identity and belonging, and adopted policy proposals that have limited the 
freedoms of minority populations and have kept migrants out. 
4.4 Refugee Crisis 
In September 2015, at the height of the refugee crisis, and as EU states 
struggled to agree to a mechanism to distribute 160,000 Syrian refugees from Italy 
and Greece across the 28 member bloc, Germany announced it would open its doors 
to asylum seekers and refused to put a ceiling on the number of refugees it would 
accept. “We can do this,” Merkel famously said. “These people must be given a home 
free of fear and terror,” she said. 132 Over the next several months, Germany received 
some 1.1 million applications for asylum. Despite some initial enthusiasm from 
residents and international leaders, by December 2015, Merkel began to face a 
backlash, not least from her own party coalition. Horst Seehofer, head of the 
conservative Christian Social Union the CDU’s counterpart in Bavaria, a 
predominantly Catholic province, balked, chiefly because more than half a million 
Muslim asylum seekers had entered Germany through Bavaria. 133 He demanded the 
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creation of transit zones.134 She also faced resistance from the left, the Social 
Democratic Party's Sigmar Gabriel, her vice chancellor who denounced the creation 
of such zones as “detention centers.”135 The back and forth political wrangling 
created much uncertainty in Germany and a loss of trust in Merkel’s ability to 
effectively deal with the situation.  
What prompted Merkel at the height of the refugee crisis to make such a 
decision? Though admirable from a humanitarian perspective, it was certain to have 
major political implications at home where anti-immigrant sentiment was high among 
people and among European state leaders who had shown great reluctance to 
cooperate under the EU on the issue. Observers have noted that Merkel’s motivation 
has little to do with generosity or humanitarianism. Accepting the educated middle 
class refugees, like many of the displaced Syrians arriving in Germany, could be an 
economic self-interest amid rapidly declining birth rates136 and acute labor 
shortages.137 But more importantly, Merkel had intended to show leadership, in the 
context of continuing to maintain the image of Germany as the leading power on the 
big issues facing the EU, boosting her own position regionally and internationally. 
She had thus hoped that European leaders would follow her lead by taking in more 
refugees, which would ultimately help resolve the crisis. Merkel thus had no intention 
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of solving the entirety of the crisis alone nor did she foresee such strong 
condemnations from all sides.  
According to a best selling political non-fiction book released in April 2017, 
entitled Die Getriebenen (The Driven Ones), Merkel’s decision to keep open German 
borders was neither the result of rational planning nor moral righteousness, but 
“tactical blundering and communication failures.”138 The author, Robin Alexander 
suggests that Merkel had avoided taking a major decision on the refugee crisis since it 
erupted in 2011, considering it a political minefield for a conservative leader like her. 
But in September 2015, emboldened by polls that indicated that she had strong public 
support on her side and refugees as a top concern for Germans, she decided to keep 
the borders open. This proved to be a near fatal error as by September 2016 Merkel 
faced 45 percent approval rating, one of her lowest on record.139  
4.5 Alternative for Germany party  
The controversy over migration created a favorable political context for far 
right populist parties. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which was created in 
2013 as a protest movement against bailouts for indebted EU member states like 
Greece, jumped on the opportunity. The party had only won 4.7 percent of the vote in 
the September 2013 federal election while campaigning against Merkel’s policy on 
the Euro Crisis, missing the 5 percent threshold for representation in the 
parliament.140 By 2015, the party faced few prospects as Germany’s economy 
escaped virtually unscathed from the crisis and other European economies were 
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recovering, albeit slowly. The AfD decided to take on a new theme, the next big issue 
facing Europe and made it central to its platform: the refugee crisis. The AfD almost 
exclusively began campaigning on an anti-immigration nationalist platform that is 
specifically opposed to Islam. That year the party’s co founder Bernd Lucke 
announced that he would step down out of concern that the party had become 
increasingly Islamophobic and xenophobic.141 The party nonetheless swept 22 percent 
of the vote in the 2016 local elections, pushing Merkel’s party to third place and 
defeating it in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Merkel’s home state. This caused 
shockwaves within Merkel’s party as well as in other establishment parties. “This 
isn’t pretty for us,” said Michael Grosse-Broemer, one of Merkel's top deputies in 
parliament in Berlin in an interview. AfD co-leader Frauke Petry was quick to 
pounce, “those who voted for the AfD were sending a message of protest, ”142 she 
said. “This is a slap in the face for Merkel – not only in Berlin but also in her home 
state. The voters made a clear statement against Merkel’s disastrous immigration 
policies. This put her in her place,” she added. 
As the AfD’s popularity continued to surge, Petry was emboldened to take on 
more extremist views. In January 2016 she said that in the face of the recent influx of 
refugees, the police might have to shoot people crossing the border illegally. “Police 
must stop refugees entering German soil”, she said. 143 The AfD’s website listed 
asylum and immigration, Islam and identity as the top two out of its five focus 
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issues.144 The party has also sought to emulate the FN as an example of a powerful 
party with a history of successes. According to the AfD’s program issued in 2016, 
“the ideology of multiculturalism is a serious threat to the social peace and the 
continuity of the national and cultural unity of the state” and “Islam is not part of 
Germany.”145 The program further describes that Islamic religious practices and 
procedures are at odds with Germany’s liberal and democratic constitution and in 
contradiction with German laws. The party calls for restrictions on the construction of 
mosques and minarets as well as the full-face veil in public. The party also demands 
the complete closure of the EU’s external border as well as the sealing of German 
borders. Failed asylum applicants, the AfD suggests, must be returned or expelled 
immediately and financial incentive should be put in place in order to encourage them 
to return to their countries of origin.  
Populist parties take advantage of particular historical circumstances, such as 
economic or refugee crises that can and have facilitated their upsurge.146 A fact even 
they contend with. “The migration crisis was the catalyst for our success,” Petry told 
the Guardian. The party’s leader in the Brandenburg state parliament, Alexander 
Gauland, went even further calling the refugee influx “a gift from heaven”.147 The 
party has since been trying to emulate FN ideas and continuing to capitalize on 
discontent with the management of the refugee crisis. 
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4.6 The Mainstream Parties Move to Coopt 
Soon, Merkel began backtracking on her pledge to admit refugees, in large 
part because the anti-immigration messages of the AfD had gained political traction. 
“We took on board the concerns of the people, who are worried about the future, and 
this means we want to reduce, we want to drastically decrease the number of people 
coming to us,” Merkel told ARD in 2016.148 “The most important thing in the coming 
months is repatriation, repatriation and once more, repatriation,” Merkel said.149 By 
2017, Merkel’s co-opting became even more pronounced. She launched a program 
that offered financial incentives for migrants to voluntarily return home.150 She also 
sought to speed up the deportation of failed asylum applications, policy proposals 
already outlined in the April-May 2016 AfD party platform. In December 2016, she 
announced to her party that she would support a ban on the burqa, another AfD 
proposal. An opinion poll conducted in August 2016 showed that 51 percent of 
respondents support the banning of the full-face veil.151 “In interpersonal 
communication, which plays a fundamental role here, we show our face,”152 she said. 
“And that’s why a full veil is inappropriate in our country. It should be banned 
wherever legally possible.” “It does not belong in our country,” she said of the burqa, 
“we don’t want any parallel societies. Our law takes precedence before tribal rules, 
codes of honor, and Shari’a.”153 It later emerged that very few women actually don 
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the burqa in Germany, her speech thus seemed directly aimed at courting right wing 
supporters and at neutralizing the AfD. 
4.7 The EU Turkey Deal 
In addition to moving to the right on the refugee question in domestic politics, 
Merkel also devised a foreign policy response to the political problem she faced on 
account of the AfD hardline on immigration and asylum. On March 18, 2016, with 
Germany serving as the moving force, the EU signed a deal with Turkey. In exchange 
for stemming the flow of migrants and take back Syrian refugees coming from its 
territory, Turkey would receive financial aid, visa liberation for Turkish nationals 
entering the EU, and accelerated EU membership talks. Human rights groups 
slammed the transactional approach to the deal, which focused on swapping favors, 
on policing and curbing the numbers of arrivals to the EU, rather than ensuring the 
rights of refugees under international law. “The EU-Turkey deal has been a disaster 
for the thousands who have been left stranded in a dangerous, desperate and 
seemingly endless limbo on the Greek islands,” said Gauri van Gulik, Amnesty 
International’s deputy director for Europe said. “It is disingenuous in the extreme that 
European leaders are touting the EU-Turkey deal as a success, while closing their 
eyes to the unbearably high cost to those suffering the consequences,” she added. The 
deal, however, is now wavering amid tensions between the two sides amplified by a 
recent row with the Netherlands and Germany who prevented Turkish officials from 
speaking in rallies. Turkey has also charged that the aid pledges have been too slow to 
arrive, further casting doubt on the long-term maintenance of the deal.154 
 
                                                 





Unlike in France, which I will discuss in the following chapter, where a strong 
right wing populist party has been a present feature of the political party system since 
the 1980s, right wing populism is more recent in Germany. The AfD, Germany’s 
most successful populist party to date has had limited success compared to the FN in 
France. Some scholars have suggested that Germany’s Nazi past has made German 
public less susceptible to xenophobia than the rest of Europe. German people’s 
response to the recent refugee crisis puts this theory into question. The German 
example also shows that opposition to migration is not based on economic anxiety 
nor on high unemployment rates, as is commonly suggested. Instead it is the result of 
mainstream leaders seizing ownership of populist ideas before they become 
exclusively associated with the populist right wing. The AfD party in a short amount 
of time was able to put together a political agenda that completely rejects the 
principle of allowing in Muslim migrants, primarily on the basis that they are 
different. Merkel most concerned with being re-elected to a fourth term in office, 
backtracked not only on a policy proposal but a principle she was trying to advance of 
an open and accepting Germany. This puts into question her commitments to human 
rights and to her own principles. She opted instead to outdo her own policies and 
appropriate AfD ideas. Merkel who in 2015 declared that assisting refugees was a 
humanitarian duty, then moved to advance programs that would drastically reduce 
their presence, for the sole purpose of alleviating political pressure. This points to the 
fact that Merkel’s move to assist refugees was a political decision, rather than a 
humanitarian one. The maneuver seems to have worked as Merkel climbed back up in 
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the polls while the AfD has lost about a third of its support, ahead of the September 
2017 elections. 155 It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the AfD and on 
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Chapter 5: Case Study France 
 
France is home to the most famous radical right wing party in Europe, the 
Front National (FN). Various scholars consider it the prototype of populist parties 
because of its archetypal extreme right characteristics as well as its decades-old 
influence on France’s party-system.156 The FN, under the leadership of Jean Marie Le 
Pen was created in 1972 initially as a federation of disparate forces of the French far 
right: Poujadists,157 neofascists as well as supporters of colonialism and war time 
collaborationism. In its early years, the party failed to make significant electoral gains 
mainly because it was torn by internal disagreements and voters dismissed it as far 
too extremist.158  
The party’s main preoccupation has been since its inception, on the defense of 
French national identity and values against foreign and domestic enemies, 
immigrants, the elites and the political establishment.159 Le Pen, a former paratrooper, 
was infamous for his anti-Semitism and dismissal of the Nazi gas chambers as “a 
mere detail” of World War II history. In the 1983 local elections, the tide of the FN 
began to rise. An alliance with a center-right list reached in order to defeat the 
Socialist party in the small town of Dreux, resulted in clear victory with 55 percent of 
the vote and three FN candidates placed as councilors.160 This gave the FN the 
political legitimacy as well as the visibility it needed. The following year, the FN 
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emerged as a force to be reckoned with when it won 11.2 percent in the European 
elections and 10 seats in the European Parliament.  
Scholars point to the early 1980s as being marked by pessimism. An 
economic recession, government imposed austerity measures, mounting social tension 
over unemployment and growing crime rates translated into declining faith in the 
Socialist government. They also point to a marked rise in foreign migration. This 
provided an opportunity for the FN to capitalize on economic discontent as well as on 
a sudden change in society.161 In the early years, Le Pen voters were mostly residents 
of large or medium-sized cities, who proved more susceptible to its anti-immigration 
and law and order messages. The party’s strongholds were generally in the most 
urban and industrialized regions of France. Its most solid support was drawn from 
small shopkeepers and blue-collar workers. Due to its conservative positions on 
gender issues and its extremist image, it appealed to more men than women. What 
appealed most to Le Pen voters, however, was its signature topic, immigration.  
5.1 Immigration to France 
France’s encounter with immigration has been influenced by its colonial 
legacy as well as its tradition of recruiting foreign workers starting in the early 20th 
century. The first major wave of Muslim migrants arrived in 1962, at the end of the 
Algerian War. Some 60,000 harkis, or Algerian auxiliaries in the French army, settled 
in France.162 Migration of Algerian non-combatants also rose following its 
independence from France in 1962. Migrants from France’s other former colonies in 
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North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia as well as sub-Saharan Africa also make up the 
country’s migrant population. Together Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians, 
Maghrebins, or North African Arabs, make up the largest immigrant group in 
France.163  
The post war economic growth spurt of the so-called “trentes glorieuses” 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of recruited labor migrants from Europe as well as 
additional migrant workers from North Africa. The economic crisis of the early 
1970s, however, transformed France’s relationship to immigration. In 1974, France 
officially ended its labor migration policy. Immigrants continued to arrive, however 
through family reunification, applying for asylum and entering illegally. Starting in 
the early 1980s and propelled by the anti-immigration campaign of the FN, the 
discourse on immigration began to shift away from labor and towards national 
identity. Maghrebins, given their relatively larger numbers became the focus of the 
discussion. For Le Pen, North Africans were a particular threat to national cultural 
because of their fundamental and insurmountable difference: they were Muslims.164   
For the FN, Islam is an alien culture and religion. FN leader Bruno Megret 
said that North Africans want to stay loyal to their difference and “stay 
themselves.”165 The party claimed that Islam is a conquering religion whose 
expansionist force threatens the Christian identity of the West. This is manifested in 
the 2010 campaign slogan Non a l’Islamism, no to Islamism which featured a map of 
France draped in the Algerian flag with minarets piercing through it, beside it a 
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caricatured woman donning a full-face black veil.166 For the FN, Islam is 
incompatible with features of French society and threatens the core value of laïcité as 
laid out in Article 1 of the French constitution, which formally states that France is a 
secular republic. The religious dimension of North African immigration thus has had 
a particular significance for the FN, and they have painted Islam as an intrinsically 
provocative religion as well as a threatening force to France’s secularism.167  
Unlike Germany’s perception of foreigners, the FN does not specifically 
address biological or racial differences between the French natives and the foreigners, 
nor has it specifically laid out racial features as necessary to becoming French. 
Instead, the FN speaks of “merit,” immigrants must earn the right to become French 
citizens through proving their willingness to assimilate. Assimilation however is not 
simply having a job and speaking the French language, it entails the shedding of all 
foreign cultures, religions, languages and traditions. “To be assimilated one needs 
first of all to respect and share the spiritual, moral and cultural values (of the nation). 
These need to be strong and dynamic enough to make people want to abandon their 
own values,”168 Le Pen said. For Le Pen the presence of foreigners wishing to 
preserve aspects of their cultural identity is a direct danger to French identity.169 His 
corollary is that the inclusion of foreigners into French society leads to 
multiculturalism, which in turn will result in the erosion and even disappearance of 
French identity. Le Pen depicted the French natives as victims of this intrusion and 
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this threat and portrayed immigrants as oppressors of the French people.170 The only 
solution, the FN declared, was to prioritize French citizens and for foreign migrants to 
return home, an irony given French colonial history. The party’s policy proposals 
included ending social benefits for immigrants, ending intercultural teaching in 
schools and stopping family unification applications for immigrants. In the “50 
concrete measures” against immigration laid out in the 1991 platform, the party called 
for the repatriation of foreigners to their home countries and the expulsion of 
undocumented and unemployed migrants. The FN also proposed detaining 
immigrants while their deportation was pending on the theory that this would 
discourage new migrants from coming. In addition, the party proposed measures such 
as a ban on constructing more mosques.171  
5.2 Co-option 
The FN’s messages resonated strongly with the French public. Starting in 
1986, Le Pen’s party began to surge in the polls. It won 9.7 percent of the vote in the 
legislative elections and in 1988 garnered 14 percent in the first round of presidential 
elections, cementing the FN’s status as a force to be reckoned with. The party’s 
staunch anti-immigration stance, which became widely popular among French voters, 
has played a significant role in shaping the country's immigration policy.172 
Mainstream French leaders, in an attempt to counter Le Pen’s influence, sought to not 
only co-opt the FN’s policy proposals but its rhetoric too. Even socialist leaders 
began taking on restrictive policies and tone on migration.  
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In the 1990s, center-right Republican Jacques Chirac in an attempt largely 
regarded by scholars at trying to win back the electorate that he lost to the FN in the 
election, implemented the Pasqua laws which facilitated the expulsion of immigrants 
and gave local leaders and mayors a say over who should be sent back – localizing 
the debate on migration. The Pasqua laws were officially enforced in 1993 and 
introduced what became known as the government’s “zero immigration” policy, 
which made it extremely difficult for foreigners to gain legal status in France. The 
laws required proof of uninterrupted housing and employment to renew residency. It 
also took away the right of those born on French soil to gain citizenship: children 
born in France to foreign parents have to wait until age 18 to apply for French 
nationality. These laws were aimed primarily at stemming the flow of immigration 
from North Africa.173 The Pasqua laws drew strong condemnation from the United 
Nations who said the laws trapped foreigners in “Kafkaesque limbo.” The report 
noted that under the Pasqua laws if migrants are married to French nationals or are 
parents of children born in France, they cannot be expelled, but they also do not 
qualify for legal residence or work permits. During this period, France's deportation 
figures increased, sparking protests. The sans papier, people without legal 
documents, mobilized and demonstrated in the streets. The center of the protests was 
France’s working-class suburbs, built during the postwar period to house workers in 
the outer cities’ limits. Over the decades, they have become neglected ghettos and 
even today remain powerful symbols of France’s treatment of its minority groups.  
                                                 




In 1991, Chirac said that having Spanish, Polish or Portuguese immigrants 
poses fewer problems than Muslims or blacks. “How do you think a French worker 
feels when he sees a family, a man who has maybe 3 or 4 wives and some 20 
children, make more money than him around 50,000 francs in social services of 
course, without working,” he said. “If you add to the noise and the smell, it’s no 
wonder the French worker becomes mad, it is not racist to say this,” he added. 174 The 
comments drew a strong reaction from the media who quickly likened his tone to that 
of Le Pen who responded, “Jacques Chirac uses the same discourse as the FN while 
vilifying the FN and saying it is extremist. This is a contradiction,” he said, “one 
which he [Chirac] should face, or the voters should take note of.”175  
The FN has had a direct impact through its policy-making capacities, as well 
an indirect impact on immigration policy in France by influencing the strategic 
decisions of the mainstream parties, their alliances and their policy proposals. The 
FN’s early electoral success was due to its ability to harness some first time voters as 
well as attracting a significant number of people who typically voted for the 
mainstream right wing.176 Mainstream parties in an attempt to recapture the lost 
voters and prevent further loss, have elected to co-opt issues advanced by the populist 
parties at the same time refusing to officially align themselves with Le Pen, his 
proposals ideas, or recognize that he is the source. Meanwhile the FN has been 
successful not only in attracting and holding on to voters but also in influencing the 
priority of voters who support other political parties – further creating incentives for 
                                                 
174 See full text in French: https://lesquen2017.com/2016/05/08/le-vivre-ensemble-est-un-mythe/ 
175 Watch full video in French: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4pun9Cdp6Q 
176 Guiraudon, V. and Lahav, G. (2006). Special issue on immigration policy in Europe. 1st ed. 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge. p, 72 
 
 68 
the mainstream to co-opt their ideas, as refusing would spell their demise. The FN 
without ever having participated in a government was able to impact the entire 
political sphere and cause a realignment of the party system in terms of framing the 
issue of migration and establishing it as an important social, economic and political 
priority. The FN’s influence on the national political agenda has placed issues of 
migration and national identity at the top of political electoral issues, shaped how it is 
perceived and dictated how it ought to be dealt with.  
5.3 Earthquake 
The 2002 French presidential elections produced an “earthquake” in French 
politics, or so newspaper headlines at the time described it. In the first round, Le 
Pen’s campaign slogan, “Two million unemployed workers equal two million 
immigrants,” catapulted him past the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin into second 
place in a surprise showing. His run-off against the incumbent, Chirac, galvanized the 
French public and led a massive mobilization of the left, who were in utter panic that 
Le Pen could become president. Faced with either a right-center candidate or a fascist 
as they termed Le Pen, left wing voters were forced to cast their vote for Chirac. 
Hundreds of most notably young people took to the streets “Vote for a crook, not for 
a fascist” was their rallying cry.177 Chirac won 82.2 percent of the vote in the second 
round, while Le Pen won 17.8 percent.  
Aiming to avoid a repeat of 2002, Nicholas Sarkozy, the candidate of the 
center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP),178 took on anti-immigration and 
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identity politics as a main topic in his 2007 presidential campaign. Political observers 
quickly noted that his policy proposals on immigration control and integration had 
significantly diverged from the party’s traditional stand on these issues. Sarkozy set 
ambitious quotas for the deportation of illegal residents (25,000 a year) and passed 
laws to restrict family reunification under the guise of immigration choisie, chosen 
migration based on skilled labor rather than immigration determined by family 
reunification. “If people don't like being in France they only have to leave. We’ve had 
more than enough of always having the feeling that we must apologize for being 
French. We cannot change our laws our habits or our customs because they don’t 
please a tiny minority,” he said in an interview.179 Sarkozy was blasted in the media 
after the interview for “stealing” Le Pen’s campaign slogan that year, Aimez la ou 
quittez la, “France love it or leave it.”180 In another example of appropriation of the 
theme of national identity from the FN, Sarkozy added “National Identity” to the 
name of the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. Defending himself against 
accusations that he was adopting Le Pen’s positions to woo voters from the far right, 
Sarkozy defiantly said, “If Le Pen says ‘the sun is yellow’ should I say it’s blue?” he 
asked, arguing that he was just using “common sense” in the immigration debate.181  
His strategy seemed to work. The 2007 elections ended with a massive shift of 
FN voters toward Sarkozy in the first round, leaving Le Pen with only 10 percent of 
the vote, disqualifying him from the second round.182 Surveys conducted at the time 
demonstrated that between 21 and 38 percent of Le Pen’s 2002 electorate voted for 
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Sarkozy in the first round of the 2007 elections. 183 Two-thirds of Le Pen voters voted 
for Sarkozy in the second round.184 Sarkozy defeated his Socialist rival Ségolène 
Royal in the second round, by winning 53 percent of the vote.185  
French observers speak of a profound Lepenisation186 of France and French 
society, whereby Le Pen’s ideas have become so deeply ingrained in political and 
social life that they have become permanent. This is a remarkable feat in a country 
with a strong liberal and left-wing tradition. And thus if 2007 proved to be a setback 
for the FN as a party, it amounted to a clear victory of Le Pen’s ideas. Sarkozy had 
legitimized, mainstreamed and implemented Le Pen’s rhetoric and the very principle 
of limiting migration at the expense of the social and human rights of the migrant 
population in France. The year 2007 would prove to be only a minor setback for the 
FN. As Le Pen repeatedly said, in the long run it might even bring more supporters 
who always prefer “the original to the copy.187  
5.4 Marine Le Pen  
In 2011 in a major shakeup, Marine Le Pen, Jean Marie’s youngest daughter 
took over leadership of the FN after winning an internal vote. “Politically, barring a 
few subtleties, she holds the same opinions as me,”188 Le Pen the father said of his 
daughter after her formal inauguration. Marine Le Pen nonetheless sought to distance 
herself from her father and his anti-Semitism, while staying true to the party’s base 
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and anti-immigrant policy plank as a central feature of the platform. Since taking over 
she has significantly broadened the party’s appeal by expelling extremists. In 2015 in 
a very public feud she ejected her father from the party after hailing notorious French 
wartime collaborationist Philippe Petain in an interview.189 Since taking over at the 
helm, Le Pen has sought ways to modulate her father’s tone with her own style.  
In 2010, Le Pen compared Muslims praying in the streets to Nazi occupation 
of France. “I’m sorry, but for those who really like to talk about the second world 
war, if we’re talking about occupation, we could talk about that (street prayers), 
because that is clearly an occupation of the territory,” she said at an FN rally in 
Lyons. “There are no tanks, there are no soldiers, but it is an occupation anyhow, and 
it weighs on people.”190 Rather than condemn her remarks, Sarkozy called for a 
national debate on Islam and secularism. Following the debate, interior minister 
Claude Guéant promised a countrywide ban on street prayer “within months”, saying 
the “street is for driving in, not praying”.191 Guéant said in Le Figaro newspaper 
“Praying in the street is not dignified for religious practice and violates the principles 
of secularism and it hurts the sensitivities of many of our fellow citizens.” Muslim 
groups argued that worshippers are forced to pray in the street on Fridays in the 
absence of large enough mosques. Building more is difficult, they argued, as 
according to French law, mosques and other religious houses of worship must be 
funded privately given the restrictions against using public money for religious 









purposes.192 In 2011, the ban on public prayer was imposed in Paris, forcing 
worshippers to use nearby abandoned buildings.  
Le Pen has been particularly successful in the campaigns she has launched on 
what she calls the “special demands” of the Muslim community. In 2014, Le Pen 
successfully campaigned to remove “non pork” meal options in school canteens. “We 
will accept no religious requirements in the school lunch menus,” she declared in an 
interview. “There is no reason for religion to enter into the public sphere.”193 She said 
that such provisions are aimed at “shattering secularism” and “creating special rules 
that would allow Muslims to behave differently.” 194 Le Pen has thus positioning 
herself as a defender of French secularism against Muslim migrants who want to 
impose their values on France. Public opinion has been squarely on her side. In 2014, 
53 percent believed that Muslims were accorded “too many rights.” 195  
In the runoff round of the 2012 presidential elections, Le Pen started yet 
another controversy by saying that all meat in Paris was halal – killed by cutting the 
animal's throat and letting its blood drain out. She used this as proof that the 
government was bowing down to “Islamic radicals.” “This situation is deception and 
the government has been fully aware of it for months,” Le Pen said. “All the abattoirs 
of the Paris region have succumbed to the rules of a minority. We have reason to be 
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disgusted.” 196 It later emerged that the vast majority of the meat in France was not 
slaughtered in conformity with halal practices. Few believed that the uproar had 
anything to do with how animals were slaughtered or who eats them, it was clear that 
the real purpose of the meat controversy was to stoke anxieties about the erosion of 
French national identity. In the 2012 election, Le Pen secured 13.6 percent of the vote 
in the first round of elections and 17.9 percent in the second, beating her father’s best 
ever score. 197 Socialist Party leader Francois Hollande was elected president. 
5.5 Refugee Crisis 
As migration continued to be a hot-button political issue in France’s politics, 
the refugee crisis created by the Syrian government’s crackdown on the 2011 
uprising, proved a welcome boost for Le Pen’s popularity and her agenda. France was 
not a major destination for asylum seekers, largely because of its well-known high 
unemployment rate, its excessive red tape and its unwelcoming attitude towards 
refugees. Asylum seekers instead preferred to try to head to Germany, Sweden and 
Britain. Officials however said that 80,000 people had applied for asylum in France 
since 2011, a record number. France also came under pressure to contribute to 
resettling some of the refugees who had arrived in Italy and Greece, adding pressure 
on Hollande’s government. After initially rejecting a quota system for resettling 
refugees across the EU, in 2015 France agreed to resettle 30,000 Syrians from Italy 
and Greece over a two-year period, a limited number given France’s size and its 
existing migrant population.  
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Germany had also requested that France take in some who had reached 
Germany. “We won’t take any more, Prime Minister Manuel Valls said in response in 
2016. “France never said 'come to France,’”198 he added in a reference to Germany’s 
open door policy. But it was France’s treatment of asylum seekers in the camp in 
Calais that symbolized France’s failure to effectively deal with the refugees on its 
territory. Hundreds who had hoped to reach Britain through the French town of Calais 
in northern France, some wishing to join relatives already there, others planning to 
seek work believing that jobs are more available than in France, were trapped on a 
former landfill sight, as the UK refused to accept them, citing the Dublin Regulation 
rules. France, arguing that the refugees did not want to remain in the country, refused 
to assist them. Though the estimates have varied greatly, a refugee agency said over 
8,000 people among them 1,300 unaccompanied children for months lived in the 
squalid and over-crowded Calais camp, “the Jungle” as it came to be known. Charity 
organizations provided meals for the camp’s residents, as the French government 
hesitated to offer assistance, worrying it would lure more migrants. In October 2016 
after a two-year standoff between France and the UK, authorities relocated most of 
the people to other holding facilities around Paris. The camp was destroyed multiple 
times as former residents kept returning, believing it was a better option than the over 
crowded housing facilities they were offered. In March 2017 the mayor of Calais 
banned the distribution of food to migrants as part of a campaign to prevent the 
establishment of a new camp, drawing more condemnations from charity groups.199  
 
                                                 





5.6 Le Pen on the Crisis 
Le Pen’s position on all asylum seekers — “illegals” as the FN calls them — 
“strain our public accounts” at the expense of “our own,” she told party activists in 
Marseille. 200 “Migrants are now wandering in our neighborhoods, around the train 
stations or in the slums, causing for France immense security and public hygiene 
problems,” she told the audience. The majority of asylum seekers are in fact 
economically motivated migrants, she added. “I think that the political refugees are an 
ultra-minority. To prove this I only need to show the images that I see on television. I 
have seen the images of the illegal immigrants coming, arriving in Germany from 
Hungary and other place. And of course, 99% of these images are of men,” she said, 
“I think that the men who flee their country and leave their family there, are not doing 
it to flee persecution. This is obviously done for economic reasons.”201 Families are in 
the “ultra-minority,” Le Pen said. In violation of international law, which guarantees 
protections to people fleeing war and conflict, she said asylum should only be granted 
to those being persecuted by their own government because of something they did or 
said.202 
During the EU led initiative to redistribute 160,000 migrants who had arrived 
to Greece and Italy Le Pen said: “We’re told to accept 160,000 illegal immigrants this 
year, but next year it will be 700,000 and the following it will be 1.2m,” she said 
during a party meeting in Marseille.203 She also accused Germany of seeking to 







203 Read: https://www.ft.com/content/62131206-5473-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd 
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recruit low-wage migrant “slaves” to replace its aging workforce.204 An Odoxa poll 
published in Le Parisien in September 2015 found that 55 percent of French citizens 
were opposed to emulating Germany’s decision to soften asylum rules for Syrian 
refugees. Nearly two-thirds of those surveyed said migrants came for economic 
reasons.205 In another poll in 2014, 55 percent of respondents said there were too 
many immigrants in France.206  
Le Pen had been parlaying the French public’s fear of Islam for years before 
the Paris attack killed 129 people in 2015; but that event made her message far more 
appealing. Pointing to the discovery of a Syrian passport near the remains of one of 
the suicide bombers at the national soccer stadium, Le Pen seized the opportunity 
immediately. “France and the French,” she warned a day after the attacks,” are no 
longer safe.” She demanded a crackdown on “Islamists” in the country. She proposed, 
“to expel foreigners who preach hatred on our soil.” A poll conducted days after 
found that 94 percent of French people were in favor of this proposal.207 Hollande 
tried to modulate the proposal with plans to strip French citizenship only from dual-
nationality citizens208 who are convicted of terrorism209 as part of amendments aimed 
at fighting terrorism, but it back fired. His party accused him of betraying the values 
of the left and the French Republic. The parliament also rejected the proposal – 
                                                 
204 Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-france-idUSKCN0R70WC20150907 
205 More on survey, in French: http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/sondage-pour-62-des-francais-les-
migrants-sont-des-immigres-comme-les-autres-05-09-2015-5065393.php 
206 Find poll in French: http://www.tns-sofres.com/publications/barometre-2014-dimage-du-front-
national 
207 Find poll in French: http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/sondage-elabe-bfmtv-94percent-des-francais-
pour-la-decheance-de-nationalite-des-terroristes-931488.html 
208 As opposed to those who only hold French citizenship. Members of the Socialist party accused him 
of creating a new distinction between citizens: those who are bi-national versus those with French 
citizenship only. 
209 Under current law, only dual-national citizens who have been naturalized and acquired French 
citizenship less than 10 years before a convicted crime can be stripped of their French nationality, not 
those who are born French. 
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forcing him to abandon the plan.210 The refugee crisis clearly worked to Le Pen’s 
advantage. Whereas in 2009 the FN won 6.3 percent of the vote, in the 2014 elections 
it gained nearly 25 percent.211 The 2017 presidential elections ushered in renewed 
success for Le Pen. She won 21.7% of the vote in the first round propelling her into 
the second round. She came into second place, beating her Republican and Socialist 
adversaries to third and fifth place respectively.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Marine Le Pen, and her father before her have succeeded in pulling the 
political center of gravity in France to the right, forcing center-right as well as 
Socialist party leaders to adopt stricter anti-immigration laws on migration and 
restricting the religious and social freedoms of the Muslim community. Le Pen has 
succeeded in reformulating her father’s principles into coherent political strategies, 
which have gained strong support among the French public. Far from her father’s 
often-nonsensical racist rants, she offers solutions to on-going grievances. A talented 
public speaker with a great deal of charisma, Le Pen has managed to present herself 
and her party as a legitimate alternative to mainstream parties. In 2011, 38 percent of 
respondents believed that the FN was a mainstream party representing right wing 
patriotism and traditional values. In 2016, the number rose to 46 percent.212 By 
appealing to nationalism, she has managed to hold on to her father’s blue-collar male 
supporters, and by defending secularism she has succeeded in gaining the support of 
                                                 
210 Full article: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/francois-hollande-drops-plan-to-
revoke-citizenship-of-dual-national-terrorists 
211 Find full elections results: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-
fr-2014.html 
212 See 2014 TNS Sofres Poll in French: http://www.tns-sofres.com/publications/barometre-2014-
dimage-du-front-national 
2016 poll: http://www.tns-sofres.com/publications/barometre-2016-dimage-du-front-national 
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more women and youth. She has also succeeded in convincing the majority of French 
people that her analysis of French problems and her criticism of the French 
mainstream are accurate. In 2014, 56 percent believed that Marine le Pen grasps day-
to-day French problems. The policies implemented during the latest refugee crisis, 
have thus been a symptom as well as a result of the constant shifting to the right in 
public opinion and in the leadership. The growing acceptability and popularity of the 
FN points to the life cycle of ideas, from fringe to mainstream, it also shows that the 
appropriation of ideas fails to undermine right wing populist parties, especially on the 
long-term. It has the opposite effect. It legitimizes right wing ideas and turns them 
into laws, it gives them mainstream acceptability, shedding them of their fringe 
source and legalizes them. It also further incentivizes populist leaders into coming up 














Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 There are no easy or inexpensive solutions to mass migration. By 2015, 
Turkey which hosts the largest refugee population in the world, had spent $7.6 billion 
providing for the basic needs of some 2.2 million refugees on its territory213 and 
Germany said it had spent 20 billion euros ($21 billion) in 2016 on assistance to 
refugees.214 Indeed the Syrian conflict alone has displaced nearly 6 million people out 
of a total 65.3 million refugees worldwide. 215 The resulting burden has strained the 
states that are hosting them as well as the human rights groups mandated with 
assisting them. What the refugee crisis in Europe has shown is that no country, 
certainly not Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Greece or Italy, who are currently hosting the 
majority of Syrian refugees, can or are willing to cope with the flows alone. The 
refugee challenge is enormous. No country or bloc can have a no-limit policy on 
refugees, as states have finite resources and capabilities to accept refugees. But no 
country can, or indeed should, block people fleeing war or persecution from reaching 
safety. This creates a distinct conundrum especially for liberal mainstream leaders. If 
they liberalize their policies on migration and allow more refugees to come in, they 
empower the populist right’s agenda and undermine their own position. If they 
restrict their asylum laws, they undermine their legal and moral obligations and 
endorse populist proposals. Meanwhile thousands of refugees continue to make their 
way towards Europe by sea, using riskier routes and flimsier ships as smugglers 
                                                 
213 Read: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-turkey-idUKKCN0RI0N520150918 
214 Read: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-refugees-spend-20-billion-euros-
2016-angela-merkel-crisis-budgets-middle-east-north-africa-a7623466.html 
215 Read: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html 
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attempt to bypass authorities. According to the IOM, almost 33,715 people reached 
European shores in 2017 alone, while 795 have drowned or gone missing.216  
In this thesis, I have discussed the ways in which the refugee crisis has 
contributed to the rise of populist right wing parties in Europe. These parties have 
succeeded in putting the flows of people seeking safety in Europe high on the 
political agenda by framing it as a negative and destructive force, by linking it to 
people’s most immediate concerns: their financial security, their employment 
prospects and their very identity. These high-voltage messages have persuaded public 
opinion and influenced people who do not even vote for far-right parties. These 
parties have also been able to significantly influence the political sphere by pressuring 
governments to implement restrictive policies on migration and asylum.  
I have shown that right wing populism necessitates an “other” that is 
constructed through a discourse that plays to public fears about safety and identity. 
Refugees are not one homogenous group or entity, neither are Europeans. Yet 
populism posits a neatly defined “us,” a hard working, good and moral group, versus 
“them,” an alien, suspect and dangerous interloper. During the refugee crisis, “us” 
was the native Christian population of Europe under threat, “them” was the 
economically driven illegal migrants and potential terrorists. Populist parties called 
for the exclusion of refugees by shutting their national borders, rejecting asylum 
applications and limiting refugees’ access to public services.  
By turning the flow of migrants into an enormous crisis for Europe, they have 
established that it is vital for every citizen to have a firm opinion on the matter. 
Indeed the fact that migration in the long run is a net profit for states, that the 
                                                 
216 As of 15 April 2017, find more stats: http://migration.iom.int/europe/ 
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assistance of refugees is a duty under international signed agreements, that it is well 
within Europe’s economic and political means to effectively deal with the situation 
and that Europe’s aging population could benefit from young workers, or that it is a 
moral obligation – all of these considerations have been conspicuously absent from 
the discussion on the merits of migration or the assistance of refugees. Instead, 
irrational fear has dominated the discourse on migration. In this respect right wing 
populist parties have had enormous influence. In most countries in Europe these 
parties have gone from fringe movements twenty years ago, to ruling governments in 
Switzerland, Poland and in Hungary. In Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, populist parties are in the top three largest parties.  
I have shown that right wing populist parties have been mobilizing opposition 
to migration long before the onset of the crisis and their influence has proved to be 
greater than their electorate success suggests. Indeed over the years they have 
managed to curb the religious and social freedoms of Europe’s minority Muslim 
population by helping to put in place legislation that has banned religious attire, the 
building of new mosques and minarets, and prayer in the street.  
The achievements of populist right wing parties and movements should thus 
be understood both by considering their electoral power as well as in the triumph of 
their ideas, as manifested by the mainstream parties decisions to appropriate their 
proposals in order not to lose political ground. I have shown for instance how 2 years 
after announcing Germany would welcome refugees with open arms, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel put in place financial incentives for their voluntary return – a policy 
proposal that had previously been advanced by the Alternative for Germany party 
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(AfD). Her gambit worked as the upstart party and its electoral prospects are now in 
decline. Despite the AfD’s limited electoral power, it has succeeded in forcing 
Merkel’s Social Democratic Party to move to the right on refugee policy and even to 
borrow some of their discourse. Likewise in France, the Front National (FN) has 
mounted successful campaigns that have resulted in center-right and Socialist leaders 
imposing bans on headscarves and limitations on family unification applications for 
migrants. The French example is useful because it provides an insight into the 
potential long-term effects of mainstream parties’ borrowing tactic: it backfires. It 
also leads to increased popularity and acceptability of the populist leaders and their 
ideas. The FN, considered a radical fringe party in the 1970s, is now a top contender 
in the local as well as presidential elections and a major mover and shaker of ideas. It 
remains to be seen whether a similar result will unfold in Germany.   
Though establishment leaders have been concerned with their own ability to 
control and influence public opinion on migration, they have failed to provide 
coherent policies during their election campaigns and they have hesitated to act 
decisively with the matter effectively during times of crises. This has forced them to 
play catch up during the refugee crisis, having to reverse policies already in place or 
employ ad hoc crisis-management maneuvers meant to undo political damage. 
Populist parties have thus successfully laid bare the inherent weakness of 
establishment parties: that of lacking their own concrete positions on migration and 
lacking a principled dedication to the cause of human rights. They are, after all, 
strategic actors willing to compromise on their positions and even to completely back 
track from them when faced with the prospect of losing public support and, in 
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consequence, votes. Their concern with the rise of populism and fear about losing 
their political base has shunted to the sidelines their values-based concern for the 
plight of refugees. This is particularly true of the socialist and social democratic 
parties. As a result, mainstream leaders’ behavior has often been reactionary, strategic 
and self-interested rather than principled. This, of course, has had many unfortunate 
consequences for minority rights and the rights of asylum seekers.   
 The increased restrictions have had tangible negative effects on the lives and 
futures of thousands of people. Fewer than 14,500 refugees have been relocated from 
the overcrowded camps in Greece and Italy under the two-year plan that was 
supposed to resettle 160,000 people.217 Elsewhere in Europe, Hungarian Prime 
Minister Victor Orban has housed all asylum seekers in shipping containers and 
prohibited them from leaving the premises while their applications are evaluated. 
Germany has been deporting failed asylum seekers from Afghanistan back to their 
country—notable given that Afghanistan is the world’s second largest refugee 
producing country.218 Austria passed a bill that would deny accommodation and food 
assistance to failed asylum applicants.219 For the thousands throughout Europe who 
are still waiting for final word on their asylum applications, they find themselves in 
legal limbo and living in makeshift housing or on the street. There have been other 
dismaying signs of the unwelcoming, even hostile attitudes toward refugees. Three 
men died in the Greek island of Moria in January 2017. Pictures later emerged of 
their flimsy makeshift tent camp covered in heavy snow, prompting the Greek 
                                                 
217 Read: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-austria-migrants-asylum-
seekers-homes-attacks-firebombings-doubles-accomodation-a7661831.html 





government to move the refugees to warmer shelters.220 Many have also been 
suffering from daily attacks. German authorities reported 3,533 attacks on refugees 
across Germany in 2015, which left 560 people injured, among them 43 children.221 
European officials have been slow to condemn these attacks, paving the way 
for xenophobic populist leaders to continue to shape public perceptions of refugees as 
economically driven opportunists with little to contribute to society, as potential 
security threats and foreign predators on a mission to destabilize Europe. This 
conception has done a profound injustice to the lives and futures of refugees whose 
fates depend on the resolution of complicated conflicts back home and on decisions 
about their asylum applications that are completely outside of their control.   
I have shown how the radical ideas advanced by the populist right have been 
so powerful that they have altered the entire political atmosphere. Their conceptions 
have become an inextricable part of European political discourse. Supporting the 
assistance of migrants for instance, has become a political position in and of itself that 
implies opposition to populist parties. Meanwhile the opposition to immigration has 
become the dominant, mainstream sentiment. Establishment leaders focused on re-
elections have seized populists’ proposals in an effort to neutralize their opponents, 
but in the process they have legitimized these ideas and in some cases legitimized 
their radical challengers. Ideas that were once considered fringe have now become 
acceptable and have become cemented into policies. But it does not end there. 
Populist leaders are then prompted by political self-preservation to come up with new 
                                                 
220 Read: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-idUSKBN15E1GW 




proposals, potentially more radical ones in an effort to remain relevant, putting into 
motion a new life cycle of ideas all over again.  
The refugee crisis has transformed Europe. It has sparked the increasing 
influence of right wing populist parties that has not only shaped refugee policy, but 
also undermined cooperation in the world’s most integrated bloc. There is striking 
evidence of this. In 2016, the majority of British citizens voted in favor of a 
referendum advanced by populist leaders to leave the EU and put a limit on 
migration. The departure of the UK, apart from incurring economic costs on the EU 
has also buoyed populist and Euroskeptic leaders in France, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Austria and Sweden to call for holding similar referendums on their own EU 
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Fidesz (ruling government): Hungarian civil union; JOBBIK: Movement for a better Hungary; 
PiS (ruling government): Law and Justice party; K: Kukiz’15; SVP (largest party): Swiss 
People’s Party; DF: Danish People’s Party; PS: True Finns; FRP: Progress Party; FN: Front 
National; PVV: Party for Freedom; SD: Swedish democrats; UKIP: United Kingdom 
Independence Party; XA: Golden Dawn; AfD: Alternative for Germany; LN: Northern League. 
PiS: Law and Justice Party (Poland); SVP: Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland); DF: 
Danish People’s Party (Denmark); KRF: Progress Party (Norway); FN: Front 
National (France); PVV: Party for Freedom (Netherlands); SD: Swedish Democrats 
(Sweden); UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party (UK) 
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Breakdown of total number of refugees settled  












*In September 2015, the EU agreed on a two-year plan to relocate asylum-seekers 
from Greece and Italy to other EU Member States.  
 
     source: UNHCR                                                                           As of 06 April 2017 
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